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The Pareto efficiency of pay-as-you-go public pension schemes and the potential welfare gains
from a partial or full transition to a funded systems have been investigated in much detail during the
last decade.
1 The essence of this debate can be summarised as follows: Pay-as-you-go pension
schemes involve an implicit or, sometimes, explicit tax—usually a wage tax—which is due to the
absence of actuarial fairness. This is true for “flat-rate benefit” schemes as well as for “social insur-
ance type” systems where benefits are closely linked to prior contributions, establishing some de-
gree of “intra-generational fairness” at least.
2 In the latter case, however, distortions of individual
labour–leisure decisions which are induced by this wage tax cannot be exploited to nourish a Pa-
reto-improving transition path towards a fully-funded system. As long as lump-sum payments are
ruled out as a means to ensure an efficient reform, an equivalent tax will be needed in order to
service the (implicit) public debt which is inherited from the incumbent pay-as-you-go scheme. As
a consequence, there is no instrument left to compensate the members of any generation involved in
the transition process for their potential losses (Fenge, 1995).
3
In this paper, we focus on a different question, namely on possible efficiency gains within the un-
funded pension system. We investigate the inter-temporal structure of annual (or, in a sense, “mar-
ginal”) implicit tax rates that arise within the life-cycle of each age-cohort, i.e. on an intra-
generational level. In this perspective, a new kind of potential inefficiencies enters the picture which
may be induced by unfunded pension schemes. The reason is that, against the background of a
model of inter-temporal optimisation, the timing of implicit taxes can distort individual decisions
regarding periodic labour supply. This point, which has been rarely looked at in the literature, may
shed new light on the earlier debate regarding the efficiency of pay-as-you-go schemes. In order to
fill this gap, we will discuss the problem both theoretically, applying optimum taxation results to a
conventional “overlapping generations” model, and empirically, using micro-data from Germany
for an econometric analysis of individual labour supply decisions.
For our analysis, we build on a recent contribution by Wrede (1999) who has extended the model of
Fenge (1995) in a simple, but straightforward way. Instead of dividing the relevant life-span of an
individual into two periods – a period of economic activity and old age
4 – he considers a three-
period setting with separate labour–leisure choices for the first two sub-periods. Given the different
horizons for discounting future pension claims in order to relate them to current contributions, it is
obvious that, ceteris paribus, the effective tax rate individuals are facing may differ between these
two sub-periods. Quite generally, it will be higher for young people than for elderly workers. In
                                           
1  See Breyer (1989), Homburg (1990), Brunner (1994, 1996), Fenge (1995), or Fenge and Schwager (1995).
2 Here, the term “intra-generational fairness” (Homburg and Richter, 1990) is meant to say that the tax-like portion of
annual contributions is the same for all members of a given age cohort. For instance, this is a distinctive feature of
the German public pension system where, abstracting from some minor elements entailing interpersonal redistribu-
tion, individual pension claims are proportional to the life-time profile of annual earnings, discounted by the growth
rate of average wages.
3  See Sinn (2000) for a broader review of the literature and an extended discussion.
4  Actually, a period of childhood, or youth, may precede the active phase of life. However, as long as parental deci-
sions on the number of children or on their expenses per child are not modelled, this period of life can safely be ig-
nored.3
fact, the tax-like portion of contributions can even be calculated on an annual level, thus yielding a
full life-time profile of implicit taxes. With constant contribution rates, using reasonable assump-
tions on annual interest rates, the growth rates of the number of contributors and of individual
wages, this profile will be downward sloping throughout the typical life cycle of an individual
(Beckmann, 2000).
5
From an analytical point of view, the stylised model employed by Wrede (1999) suffices to con-
clude that Fenge’s (1995) original result can be generalised to a multi-period setting only if the in-
ternal rate of return to the contributions made by young and by middle-aged workers just differs by
the interest factor – implying that, from an ex-ante perspective, the implicit tax rates imposed on
their periodical wages are the same. In any other case, the question of whether or not there are op-
portunities for Pareto-improving reforms of existing pension systems appears to be open once again.
Several routes can be taken to proceed from this finding. Assuming identical labour supply func-
tions for both sub-periods of economic activity, for instance, one might first of all look for a set of
periodical contribution rates – or, alternatively, a set of age-related accrual rates – that is suited to
meet the above condition. With some sense of realism, one may expect the interest rate to exceed
the rate of payroll growth over the relevant periods of life. Given that, it might appear a natural re-
sult to have lower contribution rates or higher accruals for entrants of the labour force than for eld-
erly workers.
6 On the other hand, if appropriate adjustments of the relevant parameters are not fea-
sible, one might argue that the differential tax treatment of wages received early in the life cycle or
later on gives rise to an additional inefficiency of existing pension schemes which has been over-
looked so far.
Here, however, we will follow a third path: allowing for individual labour–leisure decisions to vary
over the life cycle, we will explore the second-best properties of differing tax rates imposed on pe-
riodic wages which are implied in current pay-as-you-go schemes. Furthermore, we will relate our
findings on the optimal structure of implicit tax rates to an econometric assessment of individual
labour supply over the life cycle which is based on panel data for West Germany. The rest of this
paper is therefore organised as follows. In section 2 we will outline the basic model of individual
decisions in an OLG framework in the presence of a pay-as-you-go public pension scheme with
intra-generational fairness. In section 3, the second-best problems that arise in this context are being
                                           
5  As in the earlier chapters of this study, the distinction between (ear-marked) contribution rates and (implicit) tax
rates is important here: at the margin, the tax-like fraction of current contributions can be up to 100 per cent for pure
“tax–transfer variants” of pay-as-you-go institutions, and most of this discussion will not make much sense in these
cases. However, if pension claims are conditioned on the amount of earlier contributions to some extent, then part of
these contributions is equivalent to private savings and the effective tax rate is lower than the contribution rate. – We
disregard the possibilities that (a) individuals are forced to save more than they would have done without the public
pension scheme or that (b) their portfolio of old-age provision is distorted by the pension claims in terms of the risks
involved. In both of these cases, the effective tax rate would be larger than the one considered here.
6  Denoting the (periodical, not annual) interest factor by R = 1+r and the factor of payroll growth by G = 1+g, the
precise condition for Wrede’s (1999) three-period setting is this: for a given age cohort, the first-period contribution
rate θ1 and the second-period contribution rate θ2 should differ according to θ1 = θ2 R/(R+G) < θ2. At the same time,
this difference must not be reflected within the formula governing pension benefits. Instead, it should carry over to
differing rates of return. Note that for actual pension systems – far off a steady state, that is – requirements of this
type are very hard to be met. This is true even if differences in contribution rates may be feasible between age co-
horts within a given time period. An alternative way of producing the same result when contribution rates are uni-
form (θ1 = θ2 = θ) is to differentiate between periods with respect to how contributions paid convert into benefits re-
ceived later on. In this case, periodic accrual rates should be higher for period 1 than for period 2.4
looked at in some detail. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the empirical parts of the study, setting out
the methodology adopted for estimating individual labour supply functions for different age cohorts
and reporting on the results obtained. The data base for the empirical parts of our exercise is given
by pooled time-series data taken from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) for West-
German employees, running from 1988 through 1998.
7 Section 6 concludes with a discussion of our
findings and of the policy issues that may arise.
2 Individual labour supply and public pensions
in a three-period OLG framework
The timing of implicit taxes over individual life cycles is highly dependent (i) on a given individ-
ual’s labour force attachment and on his or her effective employment record; (ii) on the precise set
of rules that govern the way in which pension entitlements are built up in a specific country; (iii) on
changes in either contribution rates or (expected) benefit levels that occur at some point in time
during the periods of labour force participation and/or retirement that are relevant for a given indi-
vidual.
First of all, we will concentrate on the effects of the pay-as-you-go mechanism proper, abstracting
from redistributory elements and other institutional details of existing public pension schemes as
well as from any instationarities that may necessitate changes in the main parameters of the pension
system. Thus, we are trying to highlight the inter-temporal structure of implicit taxes for a basic
model of individual decisions in the presence of unfunded pensions. As a consequence, the pension
scheme that will be modelled here is a prototypical “social insurance” system following the German
example, based on a direct, time-invariant tax-benefit-link. Therefore, contribution rates (i.e., ex-
plicit “social security taxes”) are assumed to be constant over time. For this case, we will obtain a
clear time-profile of (implicit) periodic tax rates which is constantly decreasing over the life cycle.
The problems involved in this basic structure are relevant for a broader class of real-world cases,
especially for those (typically males) who are in principle willing to work on a full-time basis over
their entire working life.
Among the host of potential complications we will then turn to the particular problems involved in a
potential “gender tax-gap” that arises from the treatment of married couples in many public pension
schemes. There, “second earners” (typically women) are often subjected to rules that were origi-
nally designed for non-working spouses, implying that individual benefits linked to any contribu-
tions they are making from actual earnings simply replace other, non-contributory benefits they
would be entitled to receive as dependants or survivors. Deductions of this kind can be made on a
one to one basis or at lower rates. In any case, they will add to the implicit tax rates that are built
into the pay-as-you-go system as such, thus potentially affecting decisions of many women to par-
ticipate in areas of the labour market that are covered by social old-age protection.
                                           
7  For a brief description see Burkhauser et al. (1997).5
a) The time structure of implicit taxation: the basic model
The overall setting for our analyses is that of a small open economy where in each period t the in-
terest factor  t R  is exogenously determined, also fixing the capital intensity and the wage rate  t w .
For the ease of exposition we confine our attention to members of a single generation and to three
periods of their lives (effectively overlapping with the life-span of other generations). In each gen-
eration entering the labour market in period t (“generation t”) there are  t N  individuals. Thus, indi-
vidual members of generation 1 typically enter the labour force at the beginning of period 1; dis-
posable time per period is normalised to unity such that their labour supply is 
1
1 l  and leisure is given
by 
1
1 1 l − . In period 2, they are elderly workers, supplying labour 
2
2 l . (Here, lower indices denote
periods, while upper indices distinguish “young” workers in their first period of employment from
“older” workers in their second period of employment.) They retire and are entitled to receive pen-
sions  3 p  in period 3. Periodic consumption is denoted by 
1
1 c  through 
3
3 c , respectively. In the first
two periods of life, individuals consume part of their wages, while period 3 consumption is nour-
ished from old-age pensions and, if appropriate, from pure life-cycle savings – implying that there
are no bequests.
If the pension system involves no intra-generational redistribution, all individuals in generation 1
can be taken to be identical. Ex ante, each of them faces the following problem:
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In the life-time budget constraint, life-cycle savings that are used to transfer resources across peri-
ods in order to establish the optimal structure of periodic consumption just cancel out.
8 For simplic-
ity, we assume the interest factor R to remain constant across periods, while wages wt may differ
due to technological change. The parameter θ  represents the rate of ear-marked contributions to be
made to the pension scheme which operates on a pay-as-you-go basis. Given a constant θ , the indi-
viduals contribute a fixed portion of their current wages to finance for period 1 and 2 pensioners.
Once they are retired, their pension is funded by the contributions of those who are actively work-
ing in period 3.
Two further simplifications can be made. First, the relative price of consumption in each period is
determined solely by the interest factor R  which, in turn, will not be affected in the following
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8  Yet, they are needed – assuming that the optimum degree of consumption smoothing is not accomplished through
public pensions alone.6
good  1 c . Second, the simple algebra of unfunded pensions and a stylised formula for individual
benefit entitlements can be used to restate equation (2) in terms of the effective tax rates  t τ  implied
in θ . The periodic pay-as-you-go constraint of the pension system implies that pensions accruing in




3 3 3 / ) ( N N l N l w p + =θ . Here, the l -notation is meant to indicate that,
as far as the determinants of the pension budget are concerned, labour supply is exogenous to any
individual’s maximisation problem because it is averaged over a larger number of agents belonging
to subsequent age cohorts. Next, it is important to know how much of the full benefit can in fact be
attributed to contributions made in each period of life. In a prototypical “social insurance” scheme,
with strong tax-benefit links, the internal rate of return to earlier contributions  t tl w θ  can be written
in terms of periodic accrual rates  t γ , or in terms of the corresponding factors  t t Γ γ + =1  used for
indexing pension entitlements, with
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Here  t g  is the periodic growth of wage rates (from period  1 − t  to t), and  t n  is the growth rate of
generation  t over generation  1 − t . Thus,  t Γ  is mainly determined by the well-known ingredients
of the Aaron (1966) condition, i.e. the factors constituting aggregate payroll growth.
9 Given that, we
can go back to equation (2) and substitute for  3 p  a definition of individual pension benefits which
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9  In a benefit formula modelled on German institutions, for instance, where all periods of economic activity have
equal weights and the amount of benefits related to each period is determined by the ratio of individual wages over
















































Considering  the simple structure of our model, this may appear surprisingly complex. Assuming for simplicity that
population growth n and periodic labour supply l
1 and l
2 are constants, these rates of return boil down to
) 1 ( 2 2 g Γ + =  and  ) 2 / 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( 3 3 n n g Γ + + + = , respectively. For a decomposition of the internal rate of return in un-
funded pension schemes into periodic factors like Γ2 and Γ3, explaining the asymmetry of Γt with respect to n, see
Beckmann (2000).7
are the effective (benefit-adjusted or “implicit”) tax rates. If  R Γt <  is assumed throughout, then
both these effective tax rates are positive,
10 and  2 1 τ τ>  (as was argued in the introduction). Note
that the difference between periodic rates of  t τ  can be really substantial. Assuming that  t n  is zero
throughout, that wage growth is 2 percent on an annual basis (amounting to  49 . 0 = t g  over a period
of 20 years), that the annual interest rate is 4 percent (such that  19 . 1 1= − R ), and that the contribu-
tion rate θ  is 20 percent,  1 τ  would be 10.8 percent (54 % of period 1 contributions), while  2 τ
would be 6.4 percent (32 % of period 2 contributions). It may not be unreasonable to conclude that
this will affect individual decisions regarding periodic labour supply.
The above maximisation problem can finally be solved to obtain the implicit utility function
(3) ) ( , , ) 1 ( , ) 1 ( 2
1
2 1 1 I R w R w V
− − −τ τ




1 ) 1 ( τ  and the interest factor R  are the relevant prices, and
2
1
2 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( w R w I
− − + − ≡τ τ  is full income for  1 = t l , imputing the net wage to any amount of lei-
sure consumed.
For the purpose of our study, the most important result is that
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by Roy’s identity,  0 > λ  being the marginal utility of leisure, goods consumption, or – speaking
most generally – of income. Irrespective of their precise timing, taxes on wage income (or, subsi-
dies for leisure) distort the first-best allocation and, as is well-understood, decrease the welfare of
all individuals affected. If this burden exceeding the pure tax payments cannot be avoided, one
should at least attempt to minimise it. In order to do so, the main instrument is given by the time
structure of τ , i.e.  1 τ  and  2 τ .
b)A gender tax-gap
In our basic model, the way we represented the rules regarding how individual pension entitlements
are determined in many pay-as-you-go schemes is largely appropriate if we argue against the back-
ground of a rough three-period model, each period of time spanning something like 20 years, and if
                                           
10  Beckmann (2000) points to an interesting asymmetry between the two main determinants of Γt – i.e. the growth
factors of individual wages, 1+gt, and cohort size, 1+nt – which may affect the sign of τt. Since in a German-type
pension scheme, all annual contributions participate in long-term population growth in terms of their internal returns,
τt may well become negative for years that are located rather late in the individual life cycle, even though none of the
standard (“non-Aaron”) assumptions regarding r, g, and n is violated and the life-time rate of τ is positive. The only
condition is that 1+nt must be sufficiently larger than one over the relevant periods of time. This is mostly over-
looked in analyses building on two-period OLG models. In a three-period setting it may still be irrelevant with re-
spect to τ2 which, in fact, represents an aggregate rate for, say, 20 years. A fortiori this is true if we assume nt to be
close to unity in an ageing society.8
we look at individuals who are basically willing to pursue a full-time working career over their en-
tire phase of economic activity.
If, instead, we would spell out individual life-cycles on an annual basis, periodic accruals would
exhibit many non-linearities in most existing pension schemes. Important reasons are given by
minimum qualification periods, benefit rules of the “best x out of  y  years”-type, special early re-
tirement programmes, etc.
11 Some of these aspects are also relevant if we look at individuals with
more fragmented employment records. In addition, we would then have to take into account the
way in which spells of (registered) unemployment, temporary disablement, or (limited) parental
leaves are treated when it comes to calculating individual pension benefits. For instance, if we look
at individuals with long part-time careers the differentiation of accrual rates across earnings brack-
ets or regulations regarding minimum pensions for those with many years of low contributions be-
come important.
These considerations lead us to another point we are willing to deal with in more detail. In many
existing public pension schemes, there is a potential “gender tax-gap” implying systematic differ-
ences across males vs. females regarding both their implicit life-time tax rates and their implicit
annual tax rates. One reason why both τ  and  t τ  might be lower in the case of women is that, in
most industrialised countries, life-expectancy is considerably higher for females than for the aver-
age male. In current public pension schemes, this is next to nowhere reflected by gender-specific
benefit formulae which would follow from actuarial principles. However, for women who are not
working on a full-time basis throughout their active periods of life, this effect can be more than off-
set by features like the following:
–  In the US and Japan, there are non-contributory benefits for spouses of retirees if the former
have no employment record of their own.
12 If a married woman takes up work – temporarily or
part-time, and usually at lower wage rates than the average male – she will forego (part of) the
benefits that are linked to her marital status. In other words, she will effectively have to pay
contributions without a corresponding increase in her full pension claim.
–  In many more countries, including Germany, a woman who stayed out of the labour market
most of her life is at least entitled to receive survivor benefits once her husband is deceased.
Again, these benefits are reduced if the woman holds pension claims of her own, and part of her
contributions is lost on benefits foregone.
Therefore, as long as the woman’s earnings do not exceed a relevant threshold – i.e., if her own
pension claims are not simply too high for any of these “benefit testing” procedures to be relevant at
the margin – the implicit tax rates she is facing can be much higher than those for men. (In fact, τ
can be up to 100 percent if the different types of benefits are cleared on a one to one basis.) The
basic problem is that, in both of the cases mentioned above, working women are subjected to rules
that were designed for the case of non-working housewives and mothers which were rather wide-
                                           
11  Note that many early retirement programmes that have been established during the 1980s and 1990s were intended
to allow younger people to enter the labour market instead of becoming unemployed. However, these programmes
have largely proven ineffective and are now scaled back. With “best x of y” rules, the number of years x which qual-
ify for full pension benefits is now typically extended to approach the maximum number of active years y.
12  In the US, dependants’ allowances can be up to 50 percent of the insured person’s benefit and thus are far more
important than in the case of the Japanese kokumin nenkin.9
spread in earlier times. Today, these rules may no longer be appropriate for the majority of (mar-
ried) women. Furthermore, they may now create disincentives against a fundamental trend of socio-
economic change, discouraging women with (less than) average earnings capacities to extend their
labour force attachment even if they want to.
13
If we want to state these problems more formally, we come up against certain limitations of our
simple three-period model. In its basic form, the model does neither allow for variations in life-
expectancy, nor can it easily be extended to cover an additional period of time for survivant
spouses. For the case of married women with earnings that fall in the range where reductions of
their individual pension entitlements matter we will therefore consider the following scenario, sup-
posed to cover both the existence of dependants’ allowances and survivor benefits in a simple, styl-
ised way. At the same time, we will abstract from differences in life expectancy for an instant.
Building on a simple “male-chauvinist” model of household labour supply, we may take pension
benefits that are granted to dependants and survivors and are linked to the employment record of the
“first earner” in the household as being included in the husband’s budget set.
14 For his wife, these
benefits will then be exogenously given as a benefit component  3 p , while earnings-related benefits
are subject to a special (say, linear) discount δ , with  1 0 ≤ < δ , such that
) , ( ) 1 ( 2 2 1 1 3 3 3
f f f f f l w l w p p p θ θ δ − + = . Now, disregarding  3 p  in order to avoid double counting with
respect to the full benefit of the household and plugging in  3 3 p p
f −  in the woman’s life-time
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with  δ τ+ 1  and  δ τ+ 2  being the effective, benefit-adjusted tax rates. It is easy to see that, in this
version, implicit taxes imposed on women who are married will always be higher – by  0 > δ  – than
those falling on the benchmark-case of married (“first-earner”) men. Given this particular tax
structure, married women will then decide whether or not to participate in the labour market, either
on a full-time or a part-time basis, in periods 1 and 2.
15
Of course, differences in life-expectancies are ignored here. However, the undisputed fact that on
average women tend to live longer than males can be off-set by another aspect which becomes ap-
parent in our stylised setting. For married women who are actively working, the expected value of
                                           
13  It should be stressed here that we are primarily concerned with non-contributory benefits that are linked to just being
married, not to being a mother. In the context of pay-as-you-go pension schemes, benefits of the latter type may
serve a specific function in rewarding investment in human capital, i.e. in future workers and contributors (see Sinn
and Werding, 2000; Werding 2001). In these cases, alleviating potential conflicts between labour force participation
and child care without creating particular incentives or disincentives to do one thing or the other is clearly a matter
of its own.
14  In other words, they will be included in the amount of benefits  ) , ( 2 2 1 1 3 3
m m m m m l w l w p p θ θ =  which we mainly consid-
ered in the previous sub-section.
15  Here, we shun the introduction of more complex models of household time allocation, taking into account other
decision rules, like those related to joint optimisation or mutual altruism, as well as introducing household produc-
tion as a third option for using time instead of working in the labour market or consuming leisure. Qualitatively,
models of this kind would lead to the same result.10
survivor benefits that their husbands will be entitled to receive is very low – in fact, it will be zero
for the typical “second earner” female in most existing pension schemes. (By definition, the same is
true for women who never marry, while most of our other considerations do not apply in these
cases.) The diverging effects considered here – higher life-expectancy of women, low expected sur-
vivor benefits accruing to the husbands of working women, and several types of reductions in their
own benefits – need not cancel out. Ultimately, the existence and size of what we called a “gender
tax-gap” is an empirical issue to which we will turn now, based on an empirical illustration of the
profile of implicit tax rates for typical males and (married) females in the case of Germany.
c) Empirical illustration: the structure of implicit taxes
in the case of Germany
In sub-section a) we essentially showed that, in a generic unfunded pension system modelled on the
German Rentenversicherung, implicit tax rates falling on individual members will constantly de-
crease over the life cycle provided that (i) contribution rates (i.e., explicit “social security taxes”)
are constant over time and (ii) the benefit formula (or, rather, the tax-benefit link) remains un-
changed. Obviously, under real-world conditions things will be a bit more complicated. In Ger-
many, the benefit level has increased from some 60 percent to a current 70 percent of current wages
during the 1960s and 1970s;
16 it has then been roughly constant until very recently and is now ex-
pected to go down again to about 63 percent until the year of 2030. At the same time, contribution
rates were at 14 percent in the early 1960, then went up to a current 19.3 percent (2000) and, given
the current legal framework, are expected to approach 25 percent by 2050 (see section 2.2 a).
Given these instationarities, the effective time structure of implicit taxes for each age cohort, if
evaluated at an annual level, may be rather different from the simple profile predicted in our earlier
three-period model. Using the CESifo Pension Model, we are able to calculate the relevant time
profiles over a full working-age period of 45 years for all age cohorts starting from those born in
1929 to those born in 1999.
17 Using life expectancy data for male individuals in order to determine
the length of the retirement period and including survivor benefits for the remaining life-span of
their widows,
18 the results can be taken to represent the life-time profiles of implicit taxes for repre-
sentative (married) males in each cohort. Since the full picture – with 71 individual graphs – may
easily appear to be confusing, we confine our attention to just eight birth cohorts (born 1929, 1939,
etc.) in figure 1. 
                                           
16 Here, the benefit level is measured in terms of pensions (net of taxes, which are largely absent for a typical pensioner)
taken as a percentage of current average net earnings, assessed for an individual with a complete full-time work rec-
ord who earns average wages throughout the time spent in employment.
17  For the assumptions regarding the standardised work biographies see the appendix.
18  Thus, our calculations conform to the simple “male-chauvinist” model of household labour supply suggested in sub-
section b).11
Figure 1



















































Source: CESifo Pension Model.
It is easy to see that older age cohorts, i.e. those born 1929 through 1949, have benefited from the
expansion of the German public pension scheme that took place in the after-war period. During
their early years in employment, these cohorts had to pay rather low contribution rates, while they
are now entitled to receive pension benefits at a level which may well turn out to represent the all-
time peak within our full projection horizon.
19 For the age cohort born 1959, we have a very simple
pattern of effective annual tax rates that are slowly, but constantly, declining over time. All age co-
horts born 1969 and after are negatively affected – though each at a different stage of their life cycle
– by the up-swing of contribution rates and the down-turn of benefit levels which are projected to
take place in the coming decades, the main reasons being demographic ageing and the policy re-
sponses taken so far. In each case, however, we also observe the fundamental downward trend that
was predicted in our simple baseline model, once the parametric changes have been made and the
system settles to a new “equilibrium”. In a sense, our theoretical predictions are thus confirmed by
the empirical example, although lots of disturbances of the fundamental time pattern of implicit
taxes have to be conceded.
Interestingly enough, if we look at a smaller set of age cohorts who will effectively enter our subse-
quent empirical analysis (those born 1929 through 1977) and at the ten years that are effectively
covered by our sample period (1988 through 1997), things turn out to be less complicated. If, in-
stead of calculating tax rates as a percentage of annual earnings, we look at the tax-like fraction of
                                           
19  The negative tax rates observed for the first years of employment of these individuals clearly reflect part of the “in-
augural gains” which always arise if an unfunded pension scheme is introduced or expanded.12
annual contributions,
20 figure 2 illustrates what happens to typical males who are at different stages
of their life cycles in the period of time from which the data used in our econometric analysis are
actually taken.
21 Here, we also display the time structure of  t τ  for all individual birth cohorts con-
sidered in order to demonstrate that they really follow a clear-cut pattern. Building on these individ-
ual profiles for each birth cohort, we are able to construct an artificial life cycle spanning 45 years
which is effectively made up by a series of overlapping sub-periods of economic activity, each with
a maximum length of ten years, for all the cohorts considered.
22 As a bold line, the figure exhibits
the result of a non-linear regression that was fitted to the series of actual taxes. For individuals con-
tained in our data set, the tax-like fraction of contributions constantly decreases from about 72 per-
cent in the first year of employment to about 17 percent in the year before retirement. This clearly
conforms with our description of the basic problem we are concerned with.
Figure 2
























































y = 0,7185 – 0,0002 (age–19)
2 – 0,0033 (age–19)
Men born 1929–1977
(period 1988–97)
Source: CESifo Pension Model.
Turning to similar calculations for the case of women, we have to take into account that females can
expect to live longer on average than males. On the other hand, the women’s own pension claims
                                           
20  In terms of our earlier analysis, this fraction is something like (R
t – G
t) / R
t, now evaluated at an annual level (see
equation 2a). The portion is directly relevant for our empirical set-up because it indicates what part of contributions
made to the public pension scheme has to be subtracted when calculating net wages.
21  This is the 1988–97 interval; for more details, see section 3.
22  Effectively, the oldest cohort included in figure 2 is born in 1924, assumed to be in their last year of employment in
1988, then aged 64. In our empirical model, we effectively dropped individuals aged 60 and over, thus starting with
the birth cohort of 1929.13
will rarely extend to benefits for survivant spouses and, at the same time, are reduced if they coin-
cide with survivor (and/or spouse) benefits that originate in their husbands’ pensions. The net effect
of these diverging trends in the case of the German public pension scheme is illustrated in figure 3,
concentrating again on implicit taxes faced by (married) women born 1929 through 1977 in the
1988–1997 period and expressing these taxes implied in the pension scheme as a percentage of
contributions paid in each year in employment.
23
Figure 3
Actual implicit tax rates in Germany for the period 1988–1997: married women
Non-linear regression:
y = 0,7778 – 0,0002 (age – 19)
















































Source: CESifo Pension Model.
Comparing the results displayed in figures 2 and 3 shows that, at each point in time during the ac-
tive span of life, actual implicit taxes falling on female workers (who are married) are higher than
for their male counter-parts.
24 This is mainly what we expected based on our theoretical considera-
tions.
                                           
23  Note that, by the construction of the formula governing individual pension benefits in Germany, the profile shown in
figure 3 is not only relevant for women who are actively participating in the labour market over their full working-
age period of life. With more fragmented work records, women are subject to the same, uniform profile – their years
in employment alternating with longer periods of inactivity.
24  For women who stay single over their entire life time, the effects of higher life-expectancy and the absence of survi-
vor benefits their spouses would be entitled to receive next to cancel out. Thus, their life-time profile of actual im-
plicit tax rates is rather similar to that of typical males. Since we will not deal with this very heterogeneous sub-
group in the following, because it is hard to identify in an empirical context, we drop the results obtained for single
women.14
3 Implicit taxes and optimal taxation
In our basic model for full-time earners, two goods (leisure  t l − 1  consumed in periods 1 and 2,
respectively) are being taxed, while one (goods consumption c) is not.
25 In addition, we have seen
that the taxes that are effectively imposed on periodic wages will generally differ across periods t.
This relates our analysis to a series of standard results from the theory of optimum taxation which
are best summarised by Sandmo (1974; see also Atkinson and Sandmo, 1980).
In the tradition of optimal-taxation theory, public authorities are assumed to maximise utility V
(equation 3) subject to the additional constraint that tax revenues  2 2
1
2 1 1 1 l w R l w
− +τ τ  have to meet a
given amount of T . Here, T  is the effective net tax to be levied from individuals in a given genera-
tion across their life cycle – discounted at period 1 values – in order to keep the public debt implied
in the pay-as-you-go pension scheme on an equilibrium path. The size of T  depends on the differ-
ence between aggregate wage growth and the interest rate, as well as on the level of pensions (or the
replacement ratio) which is present in the contribution rate θ . In other words, T  is an implicit tax
on actuarial returns to earlier contributions; it is required to make the periodic budget of the pension
system, and the debt hidden behind it, just grow by the rate of payroll growth – thus making sure
that θ  can be held constant over time, provided that all other conditions for a steady state are ful-
filled.
Formulating the problem of optimum taxation in terms of a conventional Lagrangean leads to the
following set of first-order conditions:






























0 > µ  being the Lagrange multiplier associated with the revenue constraint discussed above. Util-






























By inspection of equation (6) we can now spell out a number of results regarding the optimal
structure of  t τ , i.e. the optimal timing of implicit taxes.
First of all, differentiating the individual budget constraint (2a) with respect to  t τ , yields






























Solving (7) for  t t
t l w R
− 1  and substituting the result into (6) we obtain
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It is immediate from equation (8) that, if  0 / = ∂ ∂ t c τ , optimal tax rates should be uniform across
time with  ) 1 /( 2 1 ν ν τ τ− − = = . In this case, we may thus state
Proposition 1a (“lump-sum taxation”):
If goods consumption is completely inelastic with respect to taxing labour, then a linear tax on life-
time income is optimal.
The intuition for this result is simple. With inelastic expenses on c, the tax levied on wage income
effectively turns into a (proportional) tax on life-time consumption. In optimum, it should not dis-
tort the individual’s choices between labour and leisure over the two periods considered here and,
therefore, assumes the properties of pure lump-sum taxation.
According to Sandmo (1974), there is a broader class of cases where the optimal tax structure is
linear across time. For instance, the scenario for proposition 1a to be true can be considered a spe-
cial case where, in general,  t c τ ∂ ∂ /  is not zero but depends linearly on period 1 and period 2 wage
income ( = ∂ ∂ t c τ /  t t
t l w R
− − =
1 γ ).
26 Again, a proportional tax structure can be constructed, with
= 1 τ  ) 1 /( 2 ν γ ν τ− − − = = , which solves a condition corresponding, mutatis mutandis, to equation
(8). A preference mapping which supports this result – perhaps, one among others that are not as
well received in theory – has the following properties: utility must be weakly separable between
consumption and labour (leisure) and homogeneous in the latter, representing a homothetic indiffer-
ence map for period 1 vs. period 2 leisure demand (labour supply). This leads to
Proposition 1b (“uniform taxation”):
If there is no, or no special, relationship of complementarity or substitutability between earning
wage income in period 1 or 2, respectively, and consuming goods, the optimum tax on life-time
income is also linear.
The simple assumption that labour supply functions are identical across periods is just another spe-
cial case of this variety. However, none of the cases captured by our propositions 1a or 1b appears
to be very realistic. As a matter of fact, Sandmo’s (1974, p. 705) conclusion that “proportionality
will be the exception rather than the rule” appears to be valid also in the present context, with re-
gard to the optimal structure of wage taxes on an inter-temporal level.
In an attempt to be more general, we should certainly allow for  t c τ ∂ ∂ /  to be of arbitrary form. If, in
fact, we impose no further restrictions at all on the basic optimum taxation problem, we can start by
rewriting equation (6) as
                                           
26  I.e., the substitution term must be zero or must also depend linearly on wage income if we expand ∂c/∂τt in terms of
the Slutsky decomposition. (Note that the income effect is always linear in R
1-twtlt.)16
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(see, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, ch. 12, for a canonical treatment of the “Ramsey tax prob-
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are the (symmetrical) substitution terms, evaluated at a compensated level of utility. Applying these
intermediate results to (6a) and rearranging yields:

























s τ ν τ .
The term in brackets on the right-hand-side of (9) is independent of t and can therefore be replaced
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ε
and, as it is usually done, switching the notation to tax rates imposed on wages net-of-taxes,
) 1 /( t t τ τ− , leads to














or, written in matrix form,























































respectively (taking for granted that  0 det 21 12 22 11 > − =ε ε ε ε S ). The optimal timing of effective tax



















I.e., the relation between optimal tax rates to be imposed on period t wages depends inversely on
the compensated price elasticities of labour supply in periods t, modified by compensated price
effects with respect to period  t s ≠  wages. To sum up, we may state
Proposition 2 (“Ramsey rule”):
In the general case, wages should be taxed more heavily in those periods of an individual’s working
life where
– the compensated elasticity of labour supplied with respect to the same period’s net wages (i.e.,
the own-price effect) is low if compared to that in other periods of life;
– the compensated elasticity of labour with respect to other period’s net wages (the cross-price ef-
fects) are relatively low.
This result is closely related to the well-known Ramsey rule (see, for instance, Sandmo, 1987), de-
manding that, in order to minimise distortions, the set of taxes should essentially be chosen so as to
make the role of substitution effects as small as possible.
Finally, an important special case captured by equation (12) is obtained if cross-price effects are
assumed to be absent. If  0 = ts ε , with time indices  t s ≠ ,  tt ε  can be abbreviated to read  t ε  and con-


















In this case, we may state
Proposition 3 (“inverse elasticity rule”):
If no cross-price effects are induced by taxing periodic wage income, then the optimum tax rate in
each period is inversely proportional to the (compensated) elasticity of the same period’s labour




Certainly, this is the most popular result in the theory of second-best taxation which can be applied
to the inter-temporal structure of wage taxation. If high tax rates are to be imposed on wages in18
those periods of a working life where they imply the smallest changes in (compensated) labour sup-
ply, then the overall substitution effects are clearly being minimised.
27 Thus, if the effective tax
rates implied in public pension schemes differ between early stages of an individual’s working life
and later years – as was shown to be true in section  1 for pay-as-you-go systems with intra-
generational fairness – this tax structure may be fairly rational, provided that the elasticities of peri-
odic labour supply also vary in an appropriate manner.
Building on the theoretical discussion of the inter-temporal structure of implicit tax rates, we will
now follow Sandmo’s (1974, p. 705) advice that “empirical explorations of optimal tax structures
will be valuable contributions to further study of this problem” – late but, perhaps, not too late in
applying his original results to our particular problem. In doing so, our main ambition is this: we
want to address the question of whether the current structure of effective tax rates implied in pen-
sion systems like the German pay-as-you-go scheme can –  at least, in principle – be rationalised as
reflecting typical differences in the elasticity of individual labour supply over time. In advance,
however, we have to note that inter-temporal cross-price effects are very hard to handle in an em-
pirical context. Given the limitations for a tractable empirical set-up, in fact, we have to dispense
with tests on proposition-2-type rules for the optimal tax structure from the very beginning. Instead,
we will concentrate on estimates for responses of periodic labour supply to current net wages (i.e.,
to “own” prices), checking how the timing of implicit tax rates conforms to the (compensated) “in-
verse elasticity” case. The simple structure of our three-period model and the strong assumption
regarding 0 = ts ε  may be rough stylisations. Yet, we think that proposition 3 constitutes a useful,
and mildly realistic, hypothesis which can be subjected to empirical testing.
Applying the basic rules of optimum taxation to gender-specific differences, if any, in both the level
and timing of τ  is straightforward. It is of course optimal to impose higher tax rates on those
groups of individuals who will respond less elastically than others in terms of their (inter-temporal
schedule of) labour supply. In section 2 we have argued that, in many existing pension schemes,
there is a “gender tax-gap” by which implicit tax rates are higher for (married, “second-earner”)
women than for (married) men. Therefore, the relevant rules involved in current pension systems
                                           
27  It should be noted that equation (13) is a variant – more precisely to be called the “compensated inverse elasticity
rule” – which is immediate from the Ramsey rule. A slightly differing, though perhaps even more familiar, variant is
given by the “uncompensated inverse elasticity rule”, building on the alternative restriction that uncompensated, not
compensated cross-price elasticities are zero: assuming that ∂lt/∂τt  =  0 and defining uncompensated (own-)price

















defines an optimum. Since the intuition behind the “compensated” inverse elasticity rule is much easier to under-
stand – substitution effects are distortionary, while pure income effects are not – we confine our attention to the ver-
sion derived before.
The fact that the two rules do not coincide unless income effects turn out to be zero does not indicate that they
openly contradict each other. Different simplifying assumptions apparently yield different results. What is more puz-
zling about the second version of the inverse elasticity rule is why uncompensated price elasticities should matter at
all in an optimum-taxation context. Sandmo (1987) solves this puzzle by demonstrating that, if the specific assump-
tions to be made are valid, the “uncompensated” version effectively reflects the idea behind the Corlett-Hague rule
of optimal taxation: at closer scrutiny, it is not substitution across taxed goods but rather substitutability or comple-
mentarity between taxable goods and leisure that drives this result.19
are only consistent with basic optimality conditions if labour supply is less elastic for the former in
a systematic fashion. Again, this is ultimately an empirical question.
4 Empirical evidence: methodology and data
In the empirical parts of this chapter, we build on the theoretical analysis provided in section 3,
trying to evaluate whether the timing of annual implicit tax rates in unfunded pension systems
roughly conforms with the inverse elasticity rule derived before. As we have seen in section 2, the
implicit tax rate tends to decrease over the individual life cycle – at least, this will be true when pe-
riodic contribution rates are kept constant.
28 We therefore have to check for the existence of a corre-
sponding pattern of individual labour supply, which should become more elastic over time for the
optimality conditions to apply. In any case, we need to estimate the elasticity of labour supply for
different periods of a typical life cycle with respect to taxes imposed on wages or, which amounts to
the same, with respect to net wages. As an anxillary issue, we will also look at differences in the
relevant elasticities between males and females.
a) The research strategy
To the best of our knowledge, empirical investigations into the time structure of wage elasticities of
individual labour supply are largely lacking. What existing econometric studies usually show is
that, based on static models of labour supply, labour force attachment is generally declining with
age, controlling for a number of other socio-economic variables.
29 Where age-related regressors are
also included in a quadratic form (or as a polynomial of higher order), estimated time-patterns of
individual labour supply are a little more complicated but, as a rule, labour force participation
and/or the amount of labour supplied are monotonically decreasing starting from some year of age –
usually around the late 20s or early 30s. Essentially, this corresponds to what one may think plausi-
ble in this context, observing that once young individuals have completed their education they
mostly do not hold tangible wealth; they are faced with credit-rations that are rather strict; and they
should be eager to exploit their fresh qualifications because early spells of non-participation and
non-employment can have lasting effects for their future wage rates and hence will decrease their
life-time earnings considerably.
                                           
28  In addition, we have demonstrated that the same unambiguous trend holds for the case of Germany, in spite of sub-
stantial changes of contribution rates, if we concentrate on the age-related tax profile that is relevant for individuals
who have been actively participating in the labour market during the 10-year period from 1988 through 1997 (see
figures 2 and 3).
29  For studies on the case of Germany, see Franz (1985), Strøm and Wagenhals (1991), Untiedt (1992), Kaltenborn
(2000), or Buslei and Steiner (1999, ch. 4). International surveys can be found in Killingsworth (1983, ch. 3 and 4),
Pencavel (1986) or Killingsworth and Heckman (1986). Note that the first three studies concentrate on labour supply
of women. In an empirical context, the determinants and patterns of labour supply of a typical male are mainly re-
garded to be less interesting.20
Apparently, we cannot stop here. Regarding the role of age for periodic labour supply, too much
information is lost if estimates are based on a single pooled regression for individuals sampled
across all age cohorts. One way of refining these results would be to leave the pooled estimation as
it is, but to evaluate the elasticity of labour supply with respect to wages not for the full sample or at
sample mean values for all independent variables. Instead, one could distinguish between several
age groups, calculating the relevant elasticity for young and elderly workers in separation or at
sample means for each of these sub-groups. However, this simple approach is still demanding too
much of existing results that are based on static models were samples are pooled across all age
groups. As a matter of fact, the problem we are interested in deserves additional research.
The most elegant approach to estimating  t t w l ∂ ∂ /  (and calculating compensated elasticities  t σ )
would be to rely on a fully developed dynamic (i.e., life-cycle) model of individual decisions and to
derive a consistent set of periodic labour supply functions allowing for some variation in wage
elasticity over time (see, for instance, Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; Browning, Deaton and Irish,
1985; Mulligan, 1998; Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999). Unfortunately, for this type of analysis to yield a
structural model that can be tested empirically one has to assume separability between labour–lei-
sure on the one hand and goods consumption on the other hand. In other words, the theoretical as-
sumptions that are needed for an empirical implementation effectively take us back to the scenario
required for proposition 1b to be true. We know beforehand that, given this particular set of as-
sumptions, a linear tax structure over periodic wages would be optimal. If we want to avoid this
inconsistency between the theoretical model and the empirical set-up used in our analysis, there is
no easy way out. Therefore, we will effectively drop the notion of a full inter-temporal framework.
Instead, we will consider labour supply in one period of life as being completely separated from
labour supply in other periods – simply checking whether the wage elasticity of labour supply is
higher for younger individuals than for older ones.
The basic approach then is to split a full sample of individuals (aged 20–59, for instance) into two
or more broad age groups (for example, “young” workers aged 20–39 and “older” workers aged 40–
59, etc.) and to consider a series of standard, static regressions regarding the labour supply behav-
iour of each of these groups in separation. This simple methodology – and the underlying problem
that is circumvented rather than solved here – explains why we will be unable to test for the rele-
vance of a proposition-2-type tax structure: with two or more separate regressions for periodic la-
bour supply it will be impossible to control for any cross-price effects.
It is easy to see that a major problem involved in this approach will be in dealing with potential co-
hort-effects. Lacking appropriate micro-data which cover the full life cycle of just one age-cohort,
the individuals divided into several sub-samples by age groups will also differ with respect to their
year of birth. Therefore, it is perfectly possible that any differences in labour supply showing up in
our estimates are not pure life-cycle effects. Instead, different generations can just follow different
habits and norms regarding labour force participation. For instance, the preferences of younger peo-
ple may be systematically biased towards consuming leisure if compared to those of older people.
In this case, cohort-effects could effectively dominate an age-related trend which, if considered in
isolation, would fit in well with the conditions for an optimal time structure of implicit taxes de-
rived before. Given the long period of time spanned by our data, however, there may be a possibil21
ity to overcome this kind of problem, separating life-cycle form cohort effects to a certain extent at
least.
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b)Econometric model and methods
Basically, the empirical approach follows the model employed in section 3. We assume that indi-
viduals maximise utility with respect to their consumption of goods and leisure observing a budget
constraint. The form of the utility function as well as the budget constraint are assumed to be
known, thus determining the structure of the individuals’ labour supply function. In principle, the
parameters of the utility function turn into a number of coefficients for all the determinants of indi-
vidual labour supply that are captured by the model. These coefficients can then be estimated em-
pirically.
In an empirical context, individual labour supply has two important dimensions. First, individuals
have to decide whether or not to participate in the labour market. A decision that is logically poste-
rior, but may be much more important in terms of individual responses to wage taxation, is that on
how many hours of work to supply in a given period of time. In the following, we will mainly con-
centrate on the latter aspect, investigating how the actual amount of labour supplied by men and
women in different age groups is affected by their net wage rate and, hence, by implicit taxes im-
posed on wage earnings through a pay-as-you-go pension system.
31 But before estimating labour
supply functions in terms of hours worked and calculating the relevant wage elasticities, we have to
work ourselves through a number of preliminary steps.
For individuals who are employed their wage rate (gross of taxes) is easily observable. For non-
employed individuals this piece of information is lacking. Excluding the latter from a randomly
assigned sample would involve a “sample selection bias” since the selection between those em-
ployed and those non-employed will not be exogenous with respect to the wage rate. In order to
cure this problem we will follow Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure. At the first stage, partici-
pation probabilities for all individuals (both employed and non-employed) are estimated, dropping
wages from the set of exogenous variables because they are not observable in the case of the non-
employed. This gives us a probability for the observation of a wage rate which can be used to cor-
rect for the sample selection bias when estimating a wage function over all individuals in employ-
ment. At the second stage, the wage function is estimated and applied to imputing wage rates for the
non-employed based on the fact that they share a lot of characteristics with employed individuals.
                                           
30  This is also true for a third type of effects – “period effects” – which may arise in econometric analyses based on
pooled time series that are rather short. For a survey on these issues, see Mayer and Huynink (1990); for an empiri-
cal treatment of cohort effects, see Boockmann and Steiner (2000).
31  As a matter of fact, the pure participation decision is influenced by a number of institutional details other than im-
plicit tax rates arising from the basic benefit formula embodied in a given pension system. If the focus would be on
participation vs. non-participation, special rules applying to early retirement would be very important. In addition,
other regulations that may influence the choice between an extended period of training and labour market entry
would have to be taken into account. All these incentive effects are important, deserving an individual treatment.
Here, however, we want to avoid these peculiarities by concentrating on individual in those age groups (20–59)
where they can be expected to be of minor significance. Given that, we may safely confine our attention on the ef-
fects of the simple profile of implicit taxes (see section 1) on individual choices regarding hours worked on a regular
basis.22
More specifically, we estimate a function of (hourly) real gross wage rates  it W . We then take esti-
mated gross wages for all individuals in order to simulate the corresponding net wages. For the
simulation of (changes in) net household income, we rely on a simplified model of the German tax-
transfer system, based on the tax simulation tool provided by Schwarze (1995). Effectively, our
simulation tool covers the main types of taxes and social security contributions as well as the most
important transfer programmes that are in operation in Germany.
32 Of course, we are careful in in-
cluding only the tax-like portion of social security contributions in the relevant deductions (see sec-
tion 2 c).
Here, two further problems arise demanding discussion. First, note that in the presence of progres-
sive taxation and transfers that are both determined at the household-level, hourly net wages are not
defined at an individual level. Instead, (increments in) net household income through (changes in)
labour force participation are heavily influenced by public transfers, or transfer reductions, and the
progressive nature of taxes imposed on wage earnings, including wages earned by the partner, if
any. We therefore use the information on hourly gross wages obtained from our wage estimation in
order to calculate “marginal” increases in net household income for the hypothetical case that the
individual is working one additional hour per week.
The second problem follows immediately from this procedure. If, due to progressive (household-
level) taxes and transfer reductions, net wages  it w  are given by non-linear increases in real house-
hold income they are in fact no longer fully exogenous with respect to the number of hours actually
worked. In other words, estimates that use “marginal” net wages in the sense laid out above as an
explanatory variable for labour supply  it h  observed at an individual level can be seriously distorted.
In order to take care of this potential endogeneity problem, we therefore use mean values of hours
worked ( it h ) when simulating (changes in) household net income that may be relevant for decisions
to work an extra-hour, given the individual’s gross wage  it W . Mean values are taken from appropri-
ate sub-groups of individuals (formed by age, qualification, and the number of children living in the
household), thus re-establishing exogeneity of  it w  to the extent needed.
We can then turn to the estimation of a labour supply function. Since reliable information on the
“desired” number of hours worked is rarely existent it is conventional to use hours actually worked
instead which are easily observable. At the same time, actual working hours are clearly a censored
(i.e., non-negative) variable – even if the desired number of hours may be not. The standard proce-
dure applied to investigating labour supply in terms of hours supplied is therefore given by the To-
bit model (suggested by Tobin, 1958), where the desired number of hours 
*
it h  is introduced as a la-
tent, uncensored variable and the actual number of hours  it h  is assumed to be equal to 
*
it h  if  0
* > it h ,
while it is zero otherwise. Desired hours 
*
it h  can then be considered the dependent variable in a sim-
ple index function like 
h
it it t it h υ + ′ = x β
* , where x is the vector of independent – individual- and
time-specific – variables that are assumed to influence the amount of labour supplied, β is the vec
                                           
32  For an overview, see the „Primer on German Institutions“ by Haisken-De New and Haisken-de New (1998). The
Schwarze (1995) simulation model includes taxes levied on income (Einkommensteuer, “Solidaritätszuschlag”) and
contributions related to public pensions (gesetzliche Rentenversicherung), public health care insurance (gesetzliche
Krankenversicherung), long-term care insurance (Pflegeversicherung) and unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosen-
versicherung). We augmented the simulation tool to cover the transfers provided in terms of social assistance bene-
fits (Sozialhilfe) and housing benefits (Wohngeld).23
tor of coefficients to be estimated for these exogenous variables, and 
h υ  is an independent and




it N σ υ ). Building on an economic model of
labour supply x, among other things, should include the individual’s net wage  it w  and net house-
hold income in the sense explained above.
Applying the Tobit model of labour supply to the corrected – and, hopefully, unbiased – sample of
persons who are both employed or non-employed, the expected value for the censored variable  it h
for an individual i in period t is then given by
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where φ  and Φ, respectively, represent the density and the distribution function for the standard-
ised normal distribution.
Since observable values  it h  are censored, the marginal impact of changes in  it x  is not just given by
the relevant coefficients  β ∈
j
t β . Consequently, individual- and time-specific elasticities of labour
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it h w β / ˆ ˆ ˆ ⋅ ′ Φ = x β η , where a hat indicates estimated values of coeffi-
cients and results derived from these estimates. Note that, in fact, these elasticities derived from the
estimated coefficient for net wages just represent uncompensated wage elasticities. Therefore, they
have to be decomposed into income and substitution effects in a way that is explained below. The
latter will then give us the compensated elasticities we are most interested in. As a last step to take,
individual elasticities can then be aggregated using the relevant schedule of (cross-section and two-
period longitudinal) weights in order to obtain representative estimates.
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c) Data (pooled time series)
Our econometric analysis is based on micro-data taken from the "German Socio-Economic Panel”
(GSOEP). The GSOEP is a longitudinal survey, organised in four sub-samples, covering a total of
about 8,000 households and 15,000 individuals. Meanwhile, a maximum of 15 waves (1984–1998)
is available for evaluation.
34 For the purpose of our study, we will pool the series of annual data
provided by the GSOEP to form a number of appropriate sub-samples because, given current panel
                                           
33  For each “observation” – i.e., for each individual in each year – we are effectively using information on annual
amounts of income that are collected retrospectively in subsequent waves of a panel survey. Therefore, we have to
correct the weights attached to individuals in a cross-section perspective by the probability of “survival” from period
t to period t+1. – Note that, here, individuals with hit = 0 have to be excluded. The reason is that their η
w will be infi-
nite as a purely formal implication of the way it is calculated.
34  Some additional information regarding the GSOEP data-set is included in the appendix.24
length, we cannot fully exploit their time-series structure. In doing so, we will exclude the first four
waves (1984–1987), among other things because during these early years some definitions of vari-
ables and some of the procedures involved in processing data have been changed. Taking into ac-
count the use of retrospective data, we will effectively cover information regarding the years of
1988 through 1997 only – for 10 years, that is.
In addition, we will confine our attention to West-German households of German nationality. Thus,
we want to ensure that our results are not distorted by the process of social and economic change
that is going on in East Germany in the aftermath of re-unification, or by idiosyncratic features in
the behaviour of foreigners and immigrants. Since our focus is on labour force participation, we
select individuals aged 20–59, looking at males and (married) females in turn because our theoreti-
cal considerations are most relevant for these two groups of individuals. Finally, we exclude all
persons who are self-employed or civil servants because in Germany, among other things, these
individuals are subject to a very different treatment with respect to old-age provision. We also ex-
clude those who are already in retirement. The general idea of all these restrictions is to have a
sample of individuals who are as homogenous as possible, without reducing the number of obser-
vations by too much. At the same time, we are trying not to preclude any further sub-groups which
might be relevant for the overall problem.
d)Variables
In our estimates, there are two endogenous variables: the real rate of hourly gross wages and the
actual number of hours worked, respectively. The latter is used as a proxy for the “desired” amount
of labour supply in the final Tobit model and is accounted for on a weekly basis. As was explained
before, the former is needed for imputing gross wages to persons who are not employed as the point
of departure for simulating net wages and net household income.
Exogenous variables that are assumed to determine labour supply can be grouped by the time-
variant and individual effects that they are expected to cover. Basically, period-specific effects that
are common to all individuals, are captured by a dummy variable “year of survey” (i.e., panel
wave). In addition, potential business cycle effects are represented by annual rates of unemploy-
ment which can also be interpreted as a proxy for changes in labour demand and other features of
the labour market situation that may vary over time. Individual determinants can be traced back to
variables like completed levels of schooling and professional training, years worked in full-time
employment (as a proxy for actual job experience, used as a non-linear regressor in our estimates),
35
living with a partner and with children (grouped by particular age brackets and/or measured by the
total number of children in the household).
With regard to the individual budget constraint, two further variables are clearly important: net
household income (including income derived from wages earned by the spouse, capital income,
public transfers etc.) and the net wage earned if the individual‘s labour supply is extended by one
                                           
35  In the final model, age (which might be useful as a proxy for potential job experience) was dropped from both the
wage equation and the labour supply model. It turned out that, with non-linear use of job experience, an age variable
became superfluous.25
hour. In order to avoid a potential endogeneity problem regarding the relation between net wages
and the number of hours worked, we evaluate both these variables at mean values of hours actually
worked, calculated from a larger group of “similar” individuals (identified by age, qualifications,
and household structure) – but given the individual’s gross wage rate and all other types of income
accruing to his or her household.
When estimating the wage equation the (“Heckman”) sample selection variable  it λ  enters as an
additional regressor. As a consequence, the final list of variables used in our estimates reads as fol-
lows (see table 1). Note that some of these variables are dropped in individual estimates because
problems of collinearity arise.
36
Table 1
List of variables included in the econometric model
Symbol Definition
Dependent variables
h Actual n° of hours worked per week
(if missing: n° of hours contracted)
W Real hourly gross wage (at 1995 DM)
Independent variables ... ... explaining
h W
Const Constant x x
A1989
– A1998
Year of survey (series of dummy variables):
1 = observation taken from panel wave 19xx;  0 = otherwise
x x
Urate Unemployment rate: average of year of survey x x
a
Partner Cohabitation status (dummy variable):




Children aged 0–3 or 4–6, respectively (dummy variable):
1 = living with children in the relevant age bracket;
0 = otherwise
x x
NChild N° of children (aged less than 16) in the household x x
QSchool Level of qualification #1 (dummy):
1 = secondary schooling completed;  0 = otherwise
x x
QProf Level of qualification #2 (dummy):
1 = vocational training completed;  0 = otherwise
x x
QUniv Level of qualification #3 (dummy):
1 = academic degree completed;  0 = otherwise
x x
JobExp Job experience: n° of years in full-time employment
(also included as JobExp², JobExp³, i.e. in quadratic form etc.)
x x
E0 Annual real net household income (at 1995 DM):
b
evaluated at h  (i.e., the average amount of hours worked by a sub-
group of individuals that are “similar” with respect to age, qualifica-
tions, and household structure).
x
                                           
36  However, this is mainly true for some of the “year of survey” dummies only.26
w Real net wage (at 1995 DM):
b 
∆ in net household income over E0 if the individual increases labour
supply h  by one hour a week.
x
λ Sample selection variable (Heckman correction) x
a Variable contained in the “reduced-form” participation model used on the first stage of the
Heckman (1979) procedure.
b See sub-section 4 b) for further details.
e) Cohort effects
As we have stated before, one major problem involved in our research strategy will be given by
potential cohort effects. When pooling data that cover a time span of ten years and splitting the
pooled data into two broad age groups for a first round of estimates, much of the “life-cycle” effects
on the wage elasticity of labour supply that show up in our results may effectively been driven by
the fact that “young” and “older” workers belong to different age cohorts. These cohorts may differ
with regard to labour force attachment from the very first day of their working-age period of life.
Clearly, this potential distortion must be taken into account when interpreting the results in the light
of our basic problem.
Note, however, that in a pooled sample which is based on annual survey data ranging from 1988 to
1997 the two sub-groups defined by the age brackets 20–39 and 40–59 will overlap. “Older” work-
ers are made up by the cohorts born from 1929 to 1957, while “young” workers are born between
1949 and 1977. As a consequence, 9 cohorts will be contained in both age-related sub-samples,
moving from the young to the older group of workers during the survey period. If compared to full
sub-sample length this overlap is clearly a small one. At face value it cannot be used for controlling
potential cohort effects in a systematic way. Nonetheless, the structure of our data in terms of peri-
ods and cohorts covered – with many potential overlaps – can be exploited to trace back any cohort
effects in much more detail.
Building on our basic estimates for the two sub-samples of “young” and “older” workers, we will
therefore proceed in the following direction. We split the pooled sample into two sub-samples I and
II, covering the panel waves of 1988–1992 and 1993–1997, respectively. In addition, we consider a
larger number of age groups, consisting of 5 birth cohorts in each panel wave. Given these opera-
tions, we have that all birth cohorts belong to different age groups in the two sub-samples: in sam-
ple I, they are aged 20–24, 25–29 etc., while in sample II the same individuals are aged 25–29, 30–
34 etc. In addition, all age groups are represented by two different groups of birth cohorts, one to be
taken from sample I and another from sample II. The structure of the two-dimensional classification
which is obtained in this way is illustrated in table 2. Here, age groups are listed in columns and
birth cohorts are listed in rows. The shaded cells indicate which of the potential combinations are
effectively covered by our data that are contained in either of the sub-samples I and II.
Within the above structure, the procedure of estimation is essentially the same as before. We only
concentrate on smaller groups of individuals now. Given that we have filled the table with all the
results we are looking for – i.e. with estimates for the elasticity of labour supply with respect to
wages for each of the above birth cohorts and age groups – we may then interpret any differences27
that show up in vertical direction as cohort effects, while horizontal differences can be mainly at-
tributed to life-cycle effects regarding labour supply. Of course, our results regarding life-cycle ef-
fects have to be interpreted with some care. The reason is that controlling for cohort effects in the
way suggested here inevitably boosts the role of time (and business-cycle) effects. All in all, this
piece-meal approach gives just a rough picture of what we are really interested in. Nevertheless, it
will shed some light on the overall question of whether the timing of tax rates implied in unfunded
pension schemes within an individual life cycle conforms to optimum taxation rules – at least by its
basic structure.
Table 2:
Wage elasticities of labour supply − structure of the results
age groups





















5 Individual labour supply of younger vs. elderly workers
(West-Germany 1988–1997): the results
The focus of our investigations is on typical time-patterns of the wage elasticity of labour supply
over individual life cycles, i.e. on differences between “young” and “older” workers (aged 20–39
and 40–59, respectively) or between a larger number of age groups (defined over 5-year intervals).
Regarding the number of hours worked, we will treat the cases of (all) men and (married) women
belonging to different age groups in separate estimates, thus attempting to explore the optimality of
the inter-temporal structure of implicit tax rates in some detail. For simplicity, the wage regressions
run as an intermediate step are pooled within (but not across) the two groups differentiated by gen-
der.  As a side issue, we will also look at general differences regarding the levels and trends of wage
elasticities across genders.
















We start by listing some simple summary statistics regarding the variables included in our empirical
model (plus some other useful information), grouped by the larger age-cohorts of “young” vs.
“older” workers that will be considered in the following (see tables 3a and b).
Some of the facts that are evident from tables 3a and b are clearly an artifact of our selection of in-
dividuals and our definition of age groups. This is not only true for the result that individuals in
higher age-brackets are indeed older than “young” individuals. For similar reasons, the latter are
also much more likely to live with small children, while the latter have longer job experience.
Nonetheless, among the other variables considered, differences of this kind may be relevant to some
extent for the individual probability to enter employment and to work for a given amount of time
per week. One may note in passing that – irrespective of the children’s age – young males have
about the same number of kids living in their households as older males, while on the side of mar-
ried females there is a pronounced difference regarding this number across the women’s age groups.
Young women are more likely to live with kids than anybody else, while for older women this
probability ranges close to that for men.
Table 3a
Descriptive statistics: men by age groups
Characteristics Men aged 20–39 Men aged 40–59
Sample means Std. dev. Sample means Std. dev.
Age 29.0 5.43 49.4 5.89
N° of children 0.65 0.97 0.62 0.96
Job experience (years)* 8.1 5.73 27.3 7.92
Hours worked per week* 37.0 8.95 38.6 7.05
Gross hourly wages*
,** 32.82 16.84 39.02 19.93
Marginal net hourly wages*
,** 15.74 12.13 21.97 12.92
Other net household income*
,** 19,385 8,659 23,283 11,016
Other net household income** 18,469 8,297 22,987 10,553
Net household income*
,** 34,693 19,522 48,458 26,250
Net household income** 31,569 19,326 45,674 26,035
N° of observations 9,369 5,720
   Employed 76.1 % 84.2 %
   Living with a partner 72.3 % 92.0 %
   Living with children aged 0–3 6.0 % 1.3 %
   Living with children aged 4–6 3.5 % 1.8 %
   Secondary schooling completed 89.9 % 96.4 %
   Vocational training completed 65.2 % 80.4 %
   Academic degree completed 11.3 % 11.7 %
*  Mean values referring to individuals in employment only.     **  In 1995 DM.29
From the number of hours worked per week it is easy to see that, as in many other countries, mar-
ried women who are employed work less on average than males. At the same time, there are no
major differences across (within-gender) age groups regarding this variable. Without many excep-
tions, men participate in the labour market on a full-time basis, while for women in employment the
number of hours worked per week averages at about 70 per cent of a full work-load.
Table 3b





Sample means Std. dev. Sample means Std. dev.
Age 31.8 4.55 48.3 5.53
N° of children 1.44 1.09 0.51 0.83
Job experience (years)* 6.7 4.76 12.4 9.35
Hours worked per week* 27.0 11.91 26.0 11.18
Gross hourly wages*
,** 23.04 12.43 22.96 11.37
Marginal net hourly wages*
,** 10.13 8.23 10.35 7.51
Other net household income*
,** 32,877 19,454 35,530 18,384
Other net household income** 34,383 20,364 37,006 22,276
Net household income*
,** 42,880 23,102 46,926 22,766
Net household income** 39,856 22,495 43,394 24,700
N° of observations 4,388 4,028
   Employed 50.7 % 53.9 %
   Living with a partner 100 % 100 %
   Living with children aged 0–3 12.9 % 0.7 %
   Living with children aged 4–6 8.1 % 1.0 %
   Secondary schooling completed 92.4 % 95.4 %
   Vocational training completed 74.9 % 65.1 %
   Academic degree completed 5.8 % 3.7 %
*  Mean values referring to individuals in employment only.     **  In 1995 DM.
Similarly, the participation rate of women is clearly lower than that of men, while differentiation by
age is again much smaller. More precisely, there is some difference across age brackets regarding
the fraction of individuals in employment in the case of males, while the difference is much smaller
in the case of women. The former may be explained by the fact that, given our definition of age
brackets, many of the “young” men may not have completed their formal period of training,
whereas “older” men certainly should have. The latter is slightly puzzling since the same should
hold for young women who, in addition, should be more likely to be on a parental leave than older
women. Controlling for availability for labour force participation, the fraction of young women
working may therefore be considerably higher than for older women. This, however, would fit in30
well with other evidence on one of the most visible trends in labour force attachment to be observed
not only in Germany but, even stronger, in many other industrialised countries.
This story may be supported when we look at gross hourly wages of individuals in employment.
There is clearly a gender wage-gap, but it is much smaller for young individuals than for older
workers. In fact, young males earn lower wages than older males – an interesting question being
whether this can be explained by (lack of) training on the job only or, as is largely assumed to be
true, by the fact that seniority rules play some role for the level of individual compensations in
Germany. By contrast, gross hourly pay of young married women exceeds that of women in the
higher age-bracket by a small margin. Of course, part of the explanation lies with the higher qualifi-
cations of young females if compared to older females. With the exception of academic degrees, the
former have even (more than) caught up with young males in terms of qualifications completed,
while older women are less qualified than their male counterparts. Regarding comparisons of quali-
fication between young and old it should again be noted that the picture drawn here may be incom-
plete, at least regarding academic qualifications, if individuals in lower age-brackets are still on
their way of finishing a degree. Thus, the numbers given in table 3a need not contradict, and those
in table 3b can be taken to confirm, the well-known long-term shift towards higher levels of skills
that are both offered and demanded on the labour markets of industrialised nations.
“Marginal” wage rates are calculated as the net pay earned through an extra-hour of work, evaluated
at appropriate group-averages for the number of hours worked on a regular basis, given the individ-
ual’s wage rate gross-of-taxes and net household income to be derived from other sources of in-
come. The values obtained correspond to reasonable assumptions. In Germany, marginal tax rates
can easily exceed 50 per cent. They turn out to be lower for older individuals than for the young
(among other things because the implicit tax rates involved in the pension system are declining sub-
stantially over a typical life cycle). At the same time, marginal tax rates are much higher for married
women than for men, which mainly reflects the effects of progressive taxation at the household-
level (plus higher taxes implied in public pensions). This conclusion is also confirmed by differ-
ences across the two sexes regarding other net household income, reflecting their different roles as
“first” and “second earners” in many households. Further differences regarding this variable which
can be observed between each of the two age groups are again easily explained by life-cycle effects
in terms of increasing capital income and seniority effects regarding the partners’ wage, if appropri-
ate.
Finally, differences in sample means for other net household income – and, consequently, between
total net household income – between those employed and those non-employed may be due to vari-
ous selection effects that have to be controlled for in the following. It is, however, interesting to see
that other net household income is slightly higher for employed males than for non-employed
males, whereas it is lower for employed females than for non-employed females. The latter is con-
sistent with the usual assumption of a negative income effect with respect to labour force participa-
tion, while similar effects are seemingly absent in the case of men.31
b)The wage equations
As explained before, information on gross wages is available only for individuals who actually are
employed. However, restricting attention to these individuals in order to estimate the wage elasticity
with respect to hours of work supplied involves a potential sample selection bias and may therefore
lead to distorted results. Building on the Heckman (1979) procedure, we therefore have to impute
gross wage rates – and to calculate corresponding net wages that effectively enter individual labour
supply decisions – based on wage equations estimated for the censored samples of those individuals
(males and married females) for whom wages are observable, including the sample selection vari-
able λ derived from a reduced-form model of participation probabilities.
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Table 4 represents the results of OLS regressions of real hourly gross wages against a sub-set of
independent variables that are taken to be relevant here (the full set of variables listed in table 1 as
regressors for  it W  enters the anxillary Probit model of the participation decision).
Table 4






Qprof 3.214 *** 4.78
Quniv 23.550 *** 28.58
JobExp 1.662 *** 10.86
JobExp² - 0.054 *** - 6.03
JobExp³ 0.001 *** 3.43
λ - 0.790
N° of observations 15,089
censored obs. 4,289
prob (χ > 0) 0.000
a) Married women
Qschool 3.531 *** 3.37
Qprof 4.492 *** 5.58
Quniv 12.188 *** 6.63
JobExp 0.893 *** 3.73
JobExp² - 0.005 - 0.34
JobExp³ - 0.0002 - 0.82
λ 15.770
N° of observations 8,416
censored obs. 4,569
                                           
37  The results of reduced-form estimates of participation probabilities are available on request from the authors. In
order to ease the exposition of our results, we excluded them from this report.32
prob (χ > 0) 0.000
a   Results obtained for the constant and for “year of survey” dummies are not reported.
b   Asterisks denote significance at a 10*, 5**, and 1*** percent level, respectively.
In both estimates, next to all variables included are significant and all signs of coefficients are as
expected. In the case of males, the lowest level of qualifications (“secondary schooling completed”)
turns out to have a small, and insignificant, impact on wages, while higher qualifications are clearly
important. The overall effect of job experience (which enters in a non-linear fashion) turns out to be
positive for males during their first 23 years in (full-time) employment, then eventually becoming
negative, while it is positive for women throughout their work career. In the case of women, the
non-linear use of this variable yields insignificant results. Finally, in our wage estimate for males
the selection variable is not significant (std. dev.: 0.45) and has a negative impact on wages, while it
is highly significant and positive in the case of females (std. dev.: 1.46).
c) The labour supply model
Finally, we consider the results of our Tobit estimates regarding the number of hours worked on a
regular basis, now including simulated “marginal” net wages and information regarding net house-
hold income as additional regressors. Furthermore, we now have to distinguish between the age-
groups defined before, concentrating first on the larger sub-groups of cohorts aged 20–39 and 40–
59, respectively.
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The estimates for the hours-worked model of labour supply are represented in tables 5a and b. In the
case of men, significant variables in both age classes are given by living with a partner and with
children under 3 years, the total number of children living in the household, unemployment rates
(used as a proxy for labour demand), higher levels of qualification, and increases in real net income
through working an extra-hour a week. Coefficients estimated for the Partner and the NChild vari-
ables are positive throughout. Living with children aged less than 3 years has a negative impact on
labour participation of older males, in contrast to a positive impact for the case of younger males
(where the coefficient for the “Child4–6” variable is negative, instead).
Apparently, lower levels of qualifications become less important as a determinant of participation in
the case older workers (where holding an academic degree even has a negative impact on the
amount of labour supplied). Similarly, current job experience matters a lot more for the young than
for elderly workers (where it is borderline-significant only as a linear regressor). The overall impact
of this variable on labour supply is positive throughout for both age groups. Another observation is
that the (negative) role of unemployment rates is much more pronounced for older individuals than
for the young.
                                           
38  The results related to a larger number of groups, aged 20–24, 25–29, etc., each represented by two sets of birth co-
horts taken from separate sub-samples, are available from the authors upon request.33
Table 5a
Estimates for the hours-worked model: men
Variable




Partner 2.752 *** 6.25 1.578 ** 2.20
Child3 2.121 ** 2.25 - 4.274 * - 1.92
Child4–6 - 1.158 - 1.04 0.643 0.33
Nchild 0.694 *** 2.82 2.435 *** 8.34
Qschool 2.789 *** 4.45 1.106 0.74
Qprof 3.535 *** 7.73 1.469 ** 2.32
Quniv 3.192 *** 5.00 - 2.017 ** - 2.25
JobExp 6.674 *** 29.88 0.598 * 1.69
JobExp² - 0.621 *** - 21.82 - 0.024 - 1.48
JobExp³ 0.018 *** 17.78 0.0004 1.58
Urate - 0.341 ** - 1.93 - 1.078 *** - 5.04
E0 1.99e-05 1.33 7.47e-05 *** 5.92
w 0.081 *** 3.56 0.367 *** 14.41 
N° of observations 9,369 5,720
censored obs. 2,242 903
prob (χ > 0) 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R² 6.70 % 3.91 %
a   Results obtained for the constant and for “year of survey” dummies are not reported.
b   Asterisks denote significance at a 10*, 5**, and 1*** percent level, respectively.
From an economist’s perspective, two major determinants of individual labour supply should be the
wage rate and household income. Remember first that, in order to avoid a potential endogeneity
problem, we effectively evaluated the net wage earned through an additional hour of work as well
as the net household income, including income other than wage earnings, at a “normalised” number
of hours worked based on appropriate group averages, given the individual’s gross wage. The coef-
ficients estimated for wage rates w both are highly significant and positive, which is precisely what
one would expect. If looked at the other way round, taxing wages should therefore reduce labour
supply − at least when we consider the “uncompensated” effect. The coefficient of household in-
come  0 E  is significant on a 1-percent-level in the case of older workers, while it is insignificant for
young workers. Considering the importance of early stages in a work career for effective life-time
income, this may be largely plausible. Against a theoretical background, a result that is more strik-
ing is that income effects appear to be positive in both cases considered here − an outcome not un34
common in empirical studies of labour supply for males.
39 All in all, the results obtained from our
estimates are not too unconventional, although it appears that labour supply behaviour of young
individuals is captured much better by the model than that of older workers.
Table 5b
Estimates for the hours-worked model: married women
Variable




Child3 - 18.511 *** - 12.83 - 1.406 - 0.38
Child4–6 - 0.712 - 0.46 - 4.205 - 1.19
Nchild - 9.383 *** - 23.90 - 3.247 *** - 6.95
Qschool - 4.238 *** - 2.70 - 2.927 - 1.51
Qprof - 1.213 - 1.25 - 0.307 - 0.41
Quniv - 5.251 *** - 3.10 - 12.546 *** - 5.95
JobExp 1.956 *** 4.21 - 0.022 - 0.09
JobExp² - 0.221 *** - 3.65 0.030 * 1.77
JobExp³ 0.018 *** 17.78 - 0.0005 - 1.46
Urate 0.009 *** 4.24 0.341 1.09
E0 - 8.8e-05 *** - 5.94 - 9.0e-05  *** - 5.89
w 1.089 *** 20.59 1.717 *** 32.41
N° of observations 4,388 4,028
censored obs. 2,163 1,855
prob (χ > 0) 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R² 7.36 % 7.74 %
a   Results obtained for the constant and for “year of survey” dummies are not reported.
b   Asterisks denote significance at a 10*, 5**, and 1*** percent level, respectively.
Turning to the parallel estimates run for married females (see table 5b), the picture to be drawn
based on our results is slightly different − the main similarity being that the model again seems to
be more fitting to the case of young women than to those in the higher age category. Now, variables
that are significant in both age groups are given by the number of children living in the household,
the highest level of (academic) qualification, job experience (taken in quadratic form), net house-
hold income and, again, increments in net household income through an extra-hour of work per
week − i.e., the marginal net wage.
This time, all child-related variables have a negative coefficient, which is easily explained through
child-care obligations and scarce supply of institutional day child care in Germany. Apparently,
                                           
39  For broader surveys, see the references made in footnote 29. − Note also that the overall impact of the income vari-
able on labour supply is weak: according to our estimates, an increase in net household income by 10,000 DM (by
roughly 30 per cent, that is) would lead to a 0.2 or a 0.75 increase, respectively, in the number of hours worked per
week.35
both aspects are more relevant for labour supply decisions taken by married females than by males.
Surprisingly, the coefficients related to all levels of qualifications considered in our estimate now
also exhibit negative signs. (In fact, we are lacking any explanation why women who are more
qualified tend to work less hours, controlling for all other variables.). As in the case of men, the
overall impact of current job experience (included as a non-linear regressor) is positive throughout.
As in the previous cases, it is also more important, both in terms of coefficients and significance, for
young women.
The behaviour of variables representing marginal net wages and net household income is as one
would expect, building on an economic model of labour supply. In the case of married women, all
the relevant coefficients are highly significant. The estimator for the w-coefficient is positively
signed − again predicting that wage taxation reduces the amount of labour supplied (“uncompen-
sated” effect). Furthermore, the coefficient of  0 E  now turns out to be negative, thus indicating the
regular income effect arising from theoretical considerations. We may thus conclude that labour
supply decisions taken by (married) women are more in line with the assumption of optimising be-
haviour, given wages and household income that is derived to a large extent from other sources than
the individual’s own labour force participation.
40 Again this is a common observation in empirical
studies, contrasting with the “irregular” results that are often obtained for men.
d)Wage elasticities of labour supply
Building on our estimates for the labour supply model and concentrating on effects that show up in
terms of the number of hours worked, we can then determine the elasticities of labour supply with
respect to net wages we are ultimately interested in.
As was mentioned before, we can derive the level and, to some extent, the significance of “uncom-
pensated”  effects 
w η  from the coefficients obtained for w in our estimations of the Tobit model.
41
But in order to test for whether the ratio of periodic implicit tax rates,  1 τ  and  2 τ , is related to the
wage elasticities observed for “young” vs. “older” workers in accordance with the “inverse (com-
pensated) elasticity rule”, it is the compensated wage elasticities 
w ε  we have to determine. From a
theoretical perspective, the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to wages can be
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40  At the same time, the role of income effects for individual labour supply is again limited: an increase in net house-
hold income by 10,000 DM now leads to a 0.9 decrease in the number of hours worked a week in both age groups.
41  Building on the decomposition explained below, the „significance“ of our estimation for the compensated wage
elasticity will not only depend on the t-statistics obtained for the w-coefficient, but also on the t-statistics for the E0-
variable. In cases where both variables are highly significant, this will not make a difference. Where t-statistics dif-
fer, however, we will ignore this complication.36
by the Slutsky decomposition. In theory, the substitution effect is usually expected to be positive,
while the income effect (basically determined by the income elasticity of labour supply) should be
negative. The direction of the combined effect and therefore the sign of 
w η  is open. As we have
seen in the previous sub-section, we cannot expect all the results to be well-behaved in the above
sense in an empirical context with detailed regressions for men and women in different age brack-
ets.
In order to see in some detail what happens within our econometric model, we will calculate 
w η
from the coefficient for w and decompose it into the income and substitution effects defined before.
(Note that the income effect can be derived from the coefficient estimated for  0 E  and the pure sub-
stitution effect 
w ε  can then be determined as a residual.) The final results are estimations for men
and married women which are included in table 6.
Table 6
Compensated wage elasticities of labour supply:





Compensated wage elasticity (
w ε ) 0.040 *** 0.246 ***
Income effect 0.000 0.002 ***
Uncompensated elasticity (






w ε ) 0.489 *** 0.789 ***
Income effect - 0.001 *** - 0.001 ***
Uncompensated elasticity (
w η ) 0.488 *** 0.788 ***
Asterisks denote significance at a 10*, 5**, and 1*** percent level, respectively.
Table 6 shows that (compensated) wage elasticities obtained for “older” males and married females
are higher than for those in the younger age brackets. In fact, this is the result expected beforehand,
based on the casual observation that labour force attachment gets weaker near the end of the work-
ing-age period for a number of reasons.
42 In both cases, the (within-gender) difference in elasticities
appears to be really substantial. At the same time, we observe a remarkable difference in wage elas-
ticities across the two gender groups which applies to both the age categories considered here. We
will return to the latter observation in the discussion of our results, concentrating first on an in-
depth investigation of what can be regarded the relevant life-cycle effects.
                                           
42  Note that those already receiving disability benefits or early retirement pensions were excluded from our sample. At
the same time, we are unable to control for the fact that some who would be entitled to receive the same types of
benefits may still go on working, nor can we deal in a similar fashion with some other forms of (partial) “early re-
tirement” that are more hidden – for instance, that are effectively financed through unemployment benefits.37
In order not to arrive at premature conclusions, we should take into account that both periods of
working age considered here are highly aggregated. As a matter of fact, the group of “young” work-
ers aged 20–39 mixes those who are still students (at best, working on a limited basis in order to
expand their budget) with individuals who are just entering the labour force and others who are in
the midst of their career. Similarly, the group of “elderly” workers aged 40–59 includes workers
who are at the height of their working life as well as those who are already approaching retirement.
In order to work out the potential differences in labour supply behaviour across all of these different
groups in some more detail, we therefore proceed from our basic findings by looking at a larger
number of age brackets that are more narrowly defined, at the same time attempting to disentangle
pure life-cycle effects from potential cohort effects. As a caution, one should keep in mind that em-
pirical observations regarding individual decisions on labour supply rarely follow a simple and
clear-cut pattern that is easy to interpret against the background of theoretical considerations. Tables
7a and b contain the values estimated for the compensated elasticity 
w ε  for the case of eight groups
of birth cohorts which move from one 5-year age bracket to another over two sub-samples I and II,
covering the panel waves of 1988–1992 and 1993–1997, respectively.
At a first glance, it is not easy to interpret these results – nor to relate them to the optimality condi-
tions derived in section 3, given a particular schedule of implicit tax rates that are continuously de-
clining from early stages of the working period of life to retirement age.
43 What we observe are
some irregularities – like negative, though insignificant, wage elasticities mixed with positive ones
in the case of males – and movements from one cell to another that are seemingly erratic and pro-
duce no unambiguous trend over the life cycle. Keeping in mind, however, the distinction between
life-cycle effects, to be derived from adjacent cells in a horizontal direction, and potential cohort
effects which show up in a vertical direction, we can finally detect something that at least comes
close to meaningful life-cycle patterns of wage elasticities for both males and females. This is illus-
trated in figure 4.
                                           
43 We will return to this issue in the next section.38
Table 7a
Wage elasticities of labour supply over the life cycle: men
age groups Birth




1954–62 - 0.064 - 0.011
1949–57 - 0.026 0.006
1944–52 - 0.008  0.159***
1939–47  0.163*** 0.154***
1934–42 0.134** 0.396***
1929–37 0.593***
Asterisks denote significance at a 10*, 5**, and 1*** percent level, respectively.
Table 7b
Wage elasticities of labour supply over the life cycle: married women
age groups Birth






1944–52 0.699***  0.517***
1939–47  0.747*** 0.825***
1934–42 0.909*** 0.776***
1929–37 0.871***
Asterisks denote significance at a 10*, 5**, and 1*** percent level, respectively.
In figure 4, we effectively present two estimates for the wage elasticity of labour supply for each
age group of both men and (married) women. Each of these pairs is being taken from different birth
cohorts we are following from sub-sample I to sub-sample II. Values for two successive age brack-
ets that are derived from the same set of birth cohorts are connected by a line. (Estimates that are
significant at least on a 5-percent level are highlighted by filled circles and boxes; in case the results39
are not significantly different from zero, these symbols are empty.) Now, building on our earlier
considerations, upward and downward movements in a horizontal perspective should be attributed















































Source: GSOEP (waves 1988–97); CESifo estimates.
Interpreting the results shown in figure 1 with some care, the main conclusions we can arrive at are
the following:
–  In the case of males, the compensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to net wages is
slightly higher for young individuals, aged 20–29, than for men in subsequent age groups, aged
30-44. In addition, the estimates obtained for the very young appear to be rather reliable in
terms of statistic significance.
–  In contrast, some of the estimated elasticities for middle-aged men (those in age brackets 30–
44), turn out to be negative by a small margin. At the same time, they are not significantly
different from zero. These results are not too much surprising: these are the prime aged men (in
terms of labour force attachment, that is) who are characterised by participation rates which, in
many industrialised countries, are very close to 100 per cent. Building on our analyses, they are
very likely to work anyway, irrespective of the economic incentives to do so.
                                           
44  On the other hand, horizontal movements can be affected by period effects – i.e., differences between the sub-
periods 1988–1992 and 1993–1997 – which may be imperfectly controlled by our “year of survey” dummies and by
aggregate unemployment rates for each year.40
–  For males aged 45 and over, wage elasticities of labour supply go up. Again, these results are
highly significant for all the groups of birth cohorts that fall in this category. In other words,
men who are approaching retirement are more likely to respond to economic incentives than
(all) younger men. As a consequence, implicitly taxing wages earned by these individuals must
be expected to have a stronger impact on the amount of labour supplied than implicitly taxing
wages earned by younger individuals.
–  For married females, the wage elasticity that follows from our estimates is highly significant
across all age groups. For younger women, aged 20–39, it exhibits next to no life-cycle trend.
However, as in the case of men, the wage elasticity starts to increase from the age brackets of
those 40–49 and does so over all subsequent age groups.
–  Furthermore, across all age brackets considered here the elasticity of labour supply with respect
to wages is at a remarkably higher level for married women than for men. This observation re-
flects a common result in many econometric studies where female labour supply often reacts
more flexibly to changes in the net wage.
In addition to these observations it should be noted that, in figure 4, vertical differences between the
estimates of labour supply elasticities are close to zero in the case of men. We therefore conclude
that in our estimations cohort effects for males taken from different birth cohorts are negligible. For
married women, on the other hand, we may have detected cohort effects which, for some of the age
groups considered, explain the differences in estimates based on each of the two sub-samples. As a
rule, younger women tend to be less responsive to wages in terms of their labour supply than those
born earlier when looked at during the same stage of their life cycle.
6 Is the structure of implicit taxation optimal?
The final question we have to tackle is whether the actual pattern of implicit tax rates (see section 2)
can be found to be optimal if evaluated against the background of both our theoretical and empirical
results. More precisely, we have to ask whether the inter-temporal structure of  t τ , and the gender-
specific differences, correspond to the “inverse elasticity rule” stated in our proposition 3 (see sec-
tion 3). Building on the premise that the assumptions needed to establish the “inverse elasticity
rule” as the relevant criterion of optimal taxation are sufficiently realistic, we know that the ratio of
implicit tax rates (imposed on wages net-of-taxes) applying to the case of “young” versus “older”
workers should be equal to the inverted ratio of (compensated) wage elasticities. In principle, the
same condition should hold for the case of taxing males vs. females (both regarding the inter-
temporal structure and regarding simple life-time averages of implicit tax rates). We will now look
at each of these issues in turn.
Concentrating first on the inter-temporal structure of τ and on the rough distinction between two
broad age categories, the results we obtained are summarised in table 8. Once again, the relevant tax
rates  t τ  are calculated using the CESifo Pension Model, while 
w
t ε  is known from table 6.41
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Let us start by looking at males. It appears that the ratio of implicit tax rates for the two broad sub-
periods of working age is too low to approach an efficient solution in terms of the inverse-elasticity
rule. This is true in spite of the declining profile of implicit tax rates obtained for the German public
pension scheme – concentrating on the age cohorts considered in our estimates and for the sample
period (see figure 2). In other words, the implicit tax rates for "young" workers could be increased,
or the rates for "older" workers could be decreased, in order to establish an efficient solution.
Table 9a
The time structure of implicit taxes and inverted wage elasticities over the life cycle: men

























τ (“life cycle effects” derived
for a given birth cohort)
24 – 20 τ  =  13.40 
net net
29 – 25 24 – 20 /τ τ  = 1.06  
* *
24 20 29 25 / − − ε ε  =  1.39
29 – 25 τ  =  12.73 
net net
34 – 30 29 – 25 /τ τ  = 1.07   29 25 34 30 / − − ε ε  = 1.27
34 – 30 τ  =  11.96 
net net
39 – 35 34 – 30 /τ τ  = 1.09   34 30 39 35 / − − ε ε  = 0.17
39 – 35 τ  =  11.07 
net net
44 – 40 39 – 35 /τ τ  = 1.11   39 35 44 40 / − − ε ε  = - 0.23
44 – 40 τ  =  10.06 
net net
49 – 45 44 – 40 /τ τ  = 1.14   44 40
* * *
49 45 / − − ε ε  = -19.88
49 – 45 τ  =  8.92 
net net




54 50 / − − ε ε  = 0.95
54 – 50 τ  =  7.59 
net net




59 55 / − − ε ε  = 2.96
59 – 55 τ  =  5.93  (not defined) (not defined)
Again, however, we should take into account that within the two broadly defined age groups wage
elasticities might vary a lot. In order to evaluate the inverse-elasticity rule in more detail, we there-
fore look at the life-cycle structure of implicit taxes and labour supply elasticities for the larger
number of age brackets defined over 5-year intervals (tables 9a and b).42
Since for the age brackets ranging from 30 to 44 years of age our estimates regarding wage elastici-
ties of labour supply are insignificant (and mostly exhibit an implausible sign) we should concen-
trate on the extremes. It is easy to see that the changes in implicit tax rates imposed on men aged
20–29 and 45–49 appear to be close to the optimum if measured by the inverted ratios of labour
supply elasticities during the relevant periods of time. The fact that workers who are gradually ap-
proaching retirement are effectively taxed at lower levels through participating in an unfunded pen-
sion scheme turns out to be largely appropriate, taking into account the increase in wage elasticities
estimated for these individuals.
Within this overall trend, things are slightly different with respect to the implicit tax rates placed on
men aged 50–54. Our results imply that – according to the inverse elasticity rule – the (relatively
low) implicit tax rate for these individuals is still too high if gauged by the inverse ratio of wage
elasticities. This confirms our earlier finding, based on broader age groups, that “older” workers
should be taxed even less than they actually are within an optimally designed structure of implicit
taxation. Otherwise, besides choosing one of the various routes into early retirement,
45 elderly
workers are likely to avoid working over-time hours and will try to reduce their work-load through
part-time work if their effective tax burden appears too high.
Returning to the results presented in figure 4, one may note that workers who are at the early stages
of their working life – those aged 20–29 – also react slightly more elastically to changes in net
wages than workers who are in the midst of their working career. Given that, our findings suggest
that the implicit tax profile should not be decreasing throughout the life cycle. Instead, implicit tax
rates for very young workers should be smaller than for workers who have settled in their jobs. Ab-
sent adjustments of this type, the structure of implicit taxes involved in the public pension scheme
may effectively create a barrier to fully participating in the labour market for those subjected to the
high tax rates falling on job entrants in a German-type pension system.
Building on figure 4 we may also observe that − irrespective of the erratic movements in inverse
elasticity ratios − the level of implicit tax rates imposed on males aged 30–44 will not matter too
much from an optimum taxation perspective. Here, the elasticity of labour supply with respect to
wages is close to zero, so that excess burdens of taxation will be very small. (In theory, this implies
that these individuals could be taxed at a 100 percent rate without creating many distortions.)
Turning to married females, we may conclude from table 8 – for the comparison of “young” vs.
“older” women, that is – that here the overall structure of implicit tax rates across the life cycle is
roughly consistent with the inverse elasticity rule. As in the case of males, the tax rates imposed on
women in the 40–59 group could be even lower if compared to the result obtained for women aged
20–39. However, considering the small difference between the ratios of implicit tax rates and in-
verted wage elasticities, firm conclusions regarding any inefficiencies might be overdrawn.
                                           
45  To be sure, this is an option that is not considered in our empirical model where we concentrate on labour supply in
terms of hours worked. Studying participation decisions taken by older workers in the presence of early retirement
programmes which have been defined in many countries, implying an increase in implicit tax rates to more than 100
percent if the alternative is to retire now or later without any corresponding adjustment in the level of annual pension
benefits, is clearly an important issue of its own (see, for instance, Brinch, Hernæs and Strøm, 2001).43
If we look at the timing of implicit taxes imposed on married women in more detail similar cautions
apply. Nonetheless we may state that actual tax rates that apply to married women are constantly
declining over their life cycle, while inverted ratios of wage elasticities are sometimes smaller than
one, thus indicating that an optimal tax schedule should increase for some age groups. A possible
explanation for the younger age groups is that these are women in their prime age of fertility who
respond to economic incentives when choosing the time they spend in employment while taking
care of small children. Similar things apply to older women who are mainly beyond their fertile age
(but, like those aged 40–44, perhaps are willing to take up work again following an extended pa-
rental leave).
Table 9b
The time structure of implicit taxes and inverted wage elasticities over the life cycle: 
married women

























τ (“life cycle effects” derived
for a given birth cohort)
24 – 20 τ  =  14.67 %
net net




29 25 / − − ε ε  =  1.05
29 – 25 τ  =  14.15 %
net net




34 30 / − − ε ε  = 0.85
34 – 30 τ  =  13.55 %
net net




39 35 / − − ε ε  = 0.83
39 – 35 τ  =  12.86 %
net net




44 40 / − − ε ε  = 1.11
44 – 40 τ  =  12.09 %
net net




49 45 / − − ε ε  = 0.74
49 – 45 τ  =  11.21 %
net net




54 50 / − − ε ε  = 1.10
54 – 50 τ  =  10.19 %
net net




59 55 / − − ε ε  = 0.85
59 – 55 τ  =  8.91 % (not defined) (not defined)
On the other hand, a general impression to be derived from figure 4 is that the wage elasticity of
female labour supply tends to increase for those aged 40 and over. Thus, the cohort effects that
show up in this graph suggest that, on the whole, a declining tax profile is largely appropriate for
these older age groups. In this sense, the elasticity ratios derived in table 9b may be slightly mis-
leading, because they abstract from these cohort effects, concentrating on life-cycle effects across
each pair of successive age brackets.
If we put these findings together, being careful not to overstate our case, we may thus conclude that
the optimal time structure of implicit taxes should follow an inversely “J-shaped” pattern. It is true
that this result is more obvious in the case of men than in the case of married women. Abstracting
from discretionary changes in contribution rates or benefit levels that are rarely intended to actively44
shape the life-cycle structure of implicit tax rates, actual tax profiles that arise in many existing pay-
as-you-go pension schemes are constantly declining over a typical life cycle. In other words, the
current timing of  t τ  may be roughly consistent with optimality conditions for the case of middle-
aged and older workers. But the high taxes imposed on young individuals and the slow decrease of
tax rates falling on workers who are about to enter retirement may indeed constitute problems in
terms of efficiency.
So far, we have focused on the issue of an optimal timing of implicit tax rates, treating men and
(married) women in isolation. As a last step to take, we should also spell out our final results re-
garding the (non-)optimality of the “gender tax-gap” that may exist in many public pension
schemes. In order to do so, it is mainly cross-gender differences between implicit tax rates and wage
elasticities we have to look at, rather than their structure over time. We therefore restrict our atten-
tion to the structure of  t τ  and  t ε  across males and females based on the two broad age groups con-
sidered in table 8.
46 The results are shown in table 10.
Table 10
The structure of implicit taxes and inverted wage elasticities




























































As is already immediate from figure 4, the result obtained here is strong and simple. Since women
in both age groups are much more responsive to taxes in terms of their labour supply, implicit tax
rates imposed on married women should always be lower than those imposed on men. (Taking at
face value the results displayed in table 10, their tax rates should range between one tenth and one
third in proportion to those for men.) However, given the usual “second-earner” status of many
women and the widely-used reductions in their pension benefits if the latter coincide with survivor
benefits (and, in countries like Japan and the US, additional spouse benefits accruing when their
husbands are still alive) actual tax rates for women are much higher (1.1 times higher for young
individuals and 1.3 times higher for the old) as the tax burden falling on men. In this case, the “in-
verse elasticity rule” of optimal taxation is obviously violated.
                                           
46  From the results presented in tables 7 and 9, it would be easy to derive a richer picture for the case of males vs. fe-
males building on our 5-year age brackets. Since we are generally reluctant to use our findings for very detailed
policy prescriptions – like, for instance, point estimates regarding an optimum tax schedule – we will not make use
of this option.45
7 Discussion
Now, what have we learned from our investigation into the structure of implicit taxes that are in-
volved in virtually any unfunded pension scheme? And what, if any, are the policy implications of
our findings? The answers clearly depend on how reliable we take our empirical results to be. If we
restrict our attention to the scenario which corresponds to the simple 3-period model employed in
the theoretical analysis, our conclusion might be as follows: Since in real-world pension schemes,
implicit tax rates must be expected to decrease over the life cycle, some support for the optimality
of current pay-as-you-go pension schemes can be derived from the observation that the wage elas-
ticity of labour supply tends to increase over the same span of time for both males and females. The
decline in tax rates might be even sharper than it actually is in the case of men, while it is largely
appropriate in the case of women. In any case, our estimates basically add to the efficiency results
reported in previous studies that were concerned with other aspects of unfunded (vs. funded) pen-
sion systems.
At the same time, our results point to up to three potential sources of inefficiencies entailed in many
existing public pension schemes. When investigating the time-structure of implicit taxes in some
more detail, one problem is given by the fact that the peak level of implicit taxes is usually falling
on very young individuals. Another problem is constituted by the level of implicit taxes falling on
individuals near their retirement age. Surprisingly, the problem here is not that this level of taxation
is lower than for younger individuals, but that it may still be too high considering the concomitant
increases in the wage elasticity of labour supply. A third, and perhaps most obvious, problem arises
from the higher level of implicit taxation which is relevant in general for the case of a typical sec-
ond-earner − i.e., mainly for married women.
The latter problem falls in the same class as a number of other well-known distortions of similar
type that are created through progressive household-level taxation, child-related benefits that are
inversely related to household income (or decrease with the number of hours worked by the
mother), etc. Therefore, it may not rank highest on the agenda if strengthening the incentives for
women to participate in the labour market is considered an issue. (Note that the role of these re-
forms is essentially in removing current fiscal disincentives, rather than pushing women into em-
ployment by means of subsidising their labour supply.) Nonetheless, there may be reasons to re-
define rules that govern the treatment of married couples in existing public pension schemes and, in
particular, to reconsider the wide-spread use of (“non-contributory”) survivor or spouse benefits. In
general, the key to solving these problems will be in determining individual pension claims much
more on the basis of individual accounts—for instance, with mandatory contributions to be paid for
spouses who are not working. It can be expected that for one-earner couples the burden involved in
public pension schemes would then go up. For all other individuals − men and women living in a
two-earner household as well as single males and females − it may go down because the relation
between contributions and contributory benefits should improve, ceteris paribus.
For the first type of problem mentioned above − excess burdens created through high implicit tax
rates for those who are just entering the labour force − the empirical evidence obtained through our
estimates is much weaker. Nonetheless, the existence of this problem is not implausible. Under real-46
world conditions, it can take on several disguises. Young people may prefer to work on a limited
basis only, staying in the education system for a longer period of time than is needed to invest in
future productivity or to complete a degree for signalling purposes.
47 Also, they can explore the
various routes to avoiding taxes, manipulating their number of hours worked that are subject to the
public pension scheme. For instance, young individuals may choose to enter into the shadow econ-
omy or they can evade into new types of self-employment if the latter is a strategy for not paying
social security taxes. This is one of the reasons why the German government has recently subjected
quite a number of self-employed persons to compulsory membership in the public pension system.
In Japan, simple non-compliance with the obligation to pay contributions appears to be an option
that is chosen by a growing number of (young) employees. From an economic point of view, most
of these alternatives are at least superior to simply reducing work effort. Nonetheless, they may put
public pension schemes under substantial financial pressure. Things will be even worse in the future
if the prospect is that contribution rates and, hence, implicit tax rates will go on to increase over the
next 20 to 30 years as a consequence of demographic ageing.
Finally, regarding the problem that implicit tax rates may also be “too high” for those who are just
about to enter retirement, our findings again are stronger. In practice, there are several routes for
older workers who want to exit from the labour market. Income-support programmes, which were
originally designed to deal with other contingencies, are used in many countries to finance early
withdrawal in one way or another − sometimes allowing for a partial exit. For example, some de-
gree of disability may qualify for benefits that are paid to make up for a reduction in the regular
work load. Similarly, there are programmes where part-time work of elderly workers is subsidised
through unemployment insurance benefits or even from the pension budget. Availability of these
various benefits increases the disincentives to work prior to the earliest age at which full old-age
pensions become available. In any case, older workers can respond to any disproportions between
their net pay and the elasticity of their labour supply by reducing over-time work (or asking for
compensations that are not officially recorded).
If we take these problems to be serious ones, they should be solved by reducing the implicit tax
rates involved in public pensions for young and very old workers. In theory, this can be done using
either of the two instruments that are mostly relevant for the level of  t τ : annual contribution rates as
well as annual accrual rates can be differentiated across age groups. In both cases, there are addi-
tional constraints to be observed, making sure that overall revenues and overall expenditure are not
affected and that the present value of individual contributions and benefits over the full life cycle
must not be altered. Still, this leaves some degrees of freedom for manipulating the level of annual
tax rates, reducing contribution rates or increasing periodic accruals in the relevant periods of life
that are compensated by appropriate adjustments in the full life-time structure of implicit tax rates
that apply to other age groups.
48
                                           
47  If looked at the other way round, one might interpret the higher taxes falling on young individuals as an indirect way
of subsidising higher education since they reduce the opportunity cost of extended periods of training. Yet, there
should be better ways to produce a similar effect using instruments located outside the public pension scheme that
are more targeted.
48  Remember that, at least in the case of males, we found middle-aged individuals to be rather inelastic when respond-
ing to higher (implicit) taxation.47
In practice, differentiating contribution rates by age may be harder to accomplish than varying ac-
crual rates. The reason is that administrative costs on the side of employers who would then have to
consider the age structure of their employees when paying social security taxes will matter much
more than similar effects resulting from changes in the benefit formula. Without much complica-
tions, the latter can be handled by the social security administration. As a consequence, the Austrian
example of attributing higher pension claims to contributions made at the age of 31–45 – if redi-
rected to other years of age – may indicate one sensible way of dealing with the problems that were
discussed here, thus approaching an optimal time-profile of implicit tax rates.
We should not stop without raising a more fundamental issue. In our analyses, we have constantly
assumed that individuals optimise over their entire life-span, exhibiting perfect foresight with re-
gard to all socio-demographic trends, all possible changes in the economic environment, and all the
relevant policy options. If we look at actual patterns of implicit tax rates obtained for the German
public pension scheme and for all the age cohorts born from 1929 to 1999 (figure 2), we may have
doubts as to whether these profiles are really predictable with sufficient accuracy for all the indi-
viduals affected. In addition, even if we take it for granted that the life-cycle profiles of implicit tax
rates are basically predictable – as is a natural assumption to make for an economist – one may
doubt all the more that politicians will be able to actively manage these patterns guided by the op-
timality conditions derived before.
Among other things, figure 2 illustrates that any changes in the system, expected or not, can create a
disturbance that hits up to 70 cohorts at a time, each being in a different stage of their life cycle. In
order to install an “optimal” structure of implicit tax rates, effects of this kind have to be avoided. In
fact, the structure of contribution rates or accruals that are optimally differentiated must not only
hold within a given period of time. Instead, it must be designed to hold over the full period of labour
force participation, plus retirement, of a given age cohort. It is easy to see that optimality conditions
of this kind are very hard to be met in real-world pension schemes. Furthermore, it becomes appar-
ent that adapting public pension schemes to optimum taxation rules may involve a huge loss in
flexibility regarding short-term adjustments, which is often cited as being one of the main advan-
tages of unfunded pension schemes when compared to the rigidities involved in funded systems that
are built on actuarial principles. On the other hand, inasmuch as “short-term flexibility” effectively
means susceptibility for (myopic) political manipulations, this need not be a serious drawback.
All in all, our results do not make a strong case against the efficiency of existing pay-as-you-go
pension schemes. Yet, they highlight some details where improvements may be needed, in particu-
lar with respect to the excessive implicit taxation of married women and to the sub-optimal (i.e.,
high) taxation of very young and very old workers. While women should be subjected to an indi-
vidual treatment − and not just to rules applying on a household-level − when defining their pension
benefits, all individuals should effectively be taxed conditional on their age, for instance by apply-
ing lower annual contribution rates or higher accrual rates to those at both ends of the age distribu-
tion. In a way, our results thus contradict a standard proposal that suggests to smooth the profile of
implicit tax rates across the individual life cycle. 48
Appendix
a) Description of the German Socio-economic panel (GSOEP)
The GSOEP is a longitudinal survey, organised in four sub-samples, covering a total of about 8,000
households and 15,000 individuals. Meanwhile, a maximum of 15 waves (1984–1998) is available
for evaluation.
The four sub-samples of the GSOEP are:
–  Sample A (“West Germans”) includes private households living in West Germany with a head
of the household of German nationality or of foreign nationalities that are not part of sample B;
–  Sample B (“Foreigners”) includes private households living in West Germany headed by per-
sons of Italian, Greek, Yugoslavian, Spanish, or Turkish nationality (i.e. the main ethnic groups
of foreigners living in Germany);
–  Sample C (“East Germans”) includes private households in East Germany with a German head
of the household;
–  Sample D (“Immigrants”) includes a small number of private households in which at least one
person is immigrated to West Germany since 1984.
In 1998 an additional sample E has been introduced in order to overcome panel mortality and to
expand the data base. It includes about 800 private households in West Germany and 200 House-
holds in East Germany.
Three survey instruments are essential for the GSOEP:
–  One questionnaire which has to be filled in on an annual basis, addressing a number of ques-
tions that are relevant at the household level (housing, wealth, transfers, etc.; including infor-
mation on children in the household, who cannot answer the questionnaire by themselves).
–  A second questionnaire which has to be answered annually by each person in the household
who is at least 16 years old at the beginning of the survey year. Here, quite a lot individual so-
cio-economic features are covered, including labour force participation and earnings.
–  In addition, the full biography and employment-record of each individual aged 16 and over has
to be reported once a person enters the survey. Afterwards, this type of information is up-dated
in each survey year.
In some of the panel waves, additional questions are included in the survey, focusing on specific
issues. In our analysis, however, we can rely on the information that is collected on a regular basis.
b)Standardised work biographies
As a representative agent in each age cohort, we constructed an individual with a stylised biography
and working-career (see table) which we did not alter over time (i. e. across generations). 49
The standardised agent considered in the model: basic assumptions for the case of Germany
Age 20–52 Full-time labour force participation with average earnings









Age 53–64 Reduced probability of full-time participation
→ reduced contributions based on 83.4 % of full-time earnings









Age 65–74 Period of retirement










Age 75(–86) Individual dies at age 75









Basically, we consider a male (blue or white-collar) worker who enters his active period of life at
age 20 and then earns the average of all workers throughout his career. He is fully active until some
year in his 50s when he is regarded as being disabled with some positive probability. With what is
left of his working capacity, he goes on working until age 65. Upon retirement, he is entitled to an
old-age pension accruing to himself and, where appropriate, to his spouse. When he dies, his widow
will receive a widows’ pension for some more years if these are contained in the respective pension
scheme.
49 As a result, the three main types of pension benefits – disability pensions, old-age pen-
sions, and survivor benefits – are included in our model. 
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